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There is No God but God: 
Hamas and Hezbollah between Ideology and Moderation 
 
Gida Maher Ghandour 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In recent years, scholarship on political Islam has shifted from exploring the 
compatibility between Islam and democracy towards more empirical studies 
revolving around the democratic commitments of Islamists. The moderation theory 
suggests that Islamist parties may become more moderate as a result of their 
inclusion in pluralist political processes. This thesis tests the cases of Hamas and 
Hezbollah against the inclusion-moderation theory. Can Islamist groups change 
their ideologies and behavior because of political participation? How does change 
occur and what are the tools, mechanisms and institutions that shape their 
moderation? Alternatively, is moderation instrumental and used for purely tactical 
reasons? This thesis argues that the literature on the moderation of Islamist parties 
is preoccupied with mainly endogenous variables. The latter helps explain the 
political and ideological side of the moderation of radical Islamist parties. By 
contrast, using Hamas and Hezbollah as case studies, this thesis argues that 
exogenous, namely geopolitical, factors also play an important role in whether or 
not radical Islamist parties choose to moderate their positions, especially vis-à-vis 
demobilizing their military wings and integrating fully into the political process. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction: 
            In recent years, scholarship on political Islam has shifted from exploring the 
compatibility between Islam and democracy towards more empirical studies 
revolving around the democratic commitments of Islamists and the sincerity of 
their discourse. Scholars are no longer interested in looking at core Islamic beliefs 
and evaluating whether they could coexist with democracy. More important is the 
analysis of the wide variety of Islamists, ranging from the hip moderate young 
Muslim to the radical salafi, especially with respect to opposing or coping with 
liberal democratic reforms.  What will definitely help in evaluating the sincerity of 
Islamists’ discourse is the current wave of protests that spread in the Arab World 
since January 2011. How they behaved politically determines in great part the 
prospects of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia or even Syria. The wave of popular 
protests that exploded in the Arab World  and Islamists reaction to them is bound to 
play an important role in the future of Islamist parties. It is also a test for the 
inclusion-moderation hypothesis whereby one can determine whether the inclusion 
of those political parties paved the way to their moderation.  
           Although Lebanon and the Palestinian Occupied Territories have not been 
experiencing the same level of unrest as their neighbors, both Hamas and 
Hezbollah are not immune to the repercussions of the Arab Spring. Hamas is 
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experiencing a rift between its exiled leadership and its leadership in Gaza over the 
organization’s future strategy in the wake of the popular uprising of the Arab 
Spring and the electoral success of the Islamists in the elections. Hezbollah, though 
at the outset happy with Husni Mubarak’s departure, also fears that the Arab Spring 
has changed the geopolitical game in the region. Hezbollah’s physical dominion is 
not at risk if Assad remains in power, but regime change in Syria will change their 
geopolitical landscape. How will Hezbollah react if the Syrian regime falls and will 
Hamas attempt to extricate itself from the alliance with Iran and realign with the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood? 
This thesis suggests testing the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah against the 
inclusion-moderation theory: that political groups and individuals may become 
more moderate as a result of their inclusion in pluralist political processes 
(Schwedler). In other words, can Islamist groups change their ideologies and 
behavior as a result of political participation? How does change occur and what are 
the tools, mechanisms and institutions that shape their moderation? Or, 
alternatively is moderation instrumental and used for purely tactical reasons? This 
thesis argues that the literature on the moderation of Islamist parties is preoccupied 
with mainly endogenous variables. The latter help explain the political and 
ideological side of the moderation of radical Islamist parties. By contrast, using 
Hamas and Hezbollah as case studies, this thesis argues that exogenous, namely 
geopolitical, factors also play an important role in whether or not radical Islamist 
parties choose to moderate their positions, especially vis-à-vis demobilizing their 
military wings and integrating fully into the political process. 
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1.2 Literature Review: 
          The 1980s was the era of Islamist groups. However, none of them had the 
same impact that Hamas and Hezbollah have had whether on the local, regional and 
international arenas. Hezbollah and Hamas gained their fame by resorting to 
militancy. The dissonance they created, at a later stage, between their ideology, on 
the one hand, and their political pragmatism, on the other, left many scholars, 
writers and journalists surprised.  
            Previous studies have focused on Hezbollah and Hamas’s militancy or the 
inconsistency between their ideology, on the one hand, and their responses to the 
shift which occurred in the local and regional political scene, on the other one.  
While some viewed their moderation as being behavioral, thus instrumental, others 
perceived it as being driven by purely ideological changes. Jillian Schwedler 
(2009) revisits the inclusion-moderation hypothesis with respect to political Islam 
and explores the concept of moderation. Schwedler emphasizes the behavioral 
moderation of groups, ideological moderation of groups, and ideological 
moderation of individuals.  She concludes by putting the different variants of the 
inclusion-moderation hypothesis under test. Her three models apply to much of the 
literature that is used throughout this thesis. 
Augustus Richard Norton’s work (2007) examines Hezbollah’s ideological 
transformation from a radical party to a political player. He acknowledges that 
Hezbollah has moderated its ideology in order to enter the political scene. Despite 
the many discrepancies that lies between Hezbollah’s ideology and pragmatism, he 
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argues that the opportunity to participate in politics tends to encourage pragmatism 
and compromise. Ahmad Nizar Hamze holds a completely different viewpoint. In 
his In the Path of Hezbollah (2004), he studies the structure of Hezbollah in order 
to show that there is a strong correlation between Hezbollah’s tactical pragmatism 
and its major goal, namely seizing power and establishing an Islamic state. Unlike 
Norton, Hamze believes that Hezbollah’s ideology and its pragmatism cannot be 
reconciled. Moreover, he attributes this pragmatism and the policy of “enfitah” to 
the shifting balance of power within the Iranian leadership. He emphasizes 
Hezbollah’s Islamic judicial ideology that, not only provides a source of Islamic 
legislation, but also reflects temporary flexibility in the face of transformation. 
  Joseph Eli Alagha (2006) studies how Hezbollah’s identity as an “Islamic 
Jihadi Movement” changed from being an exclusivist religious ideology, to a more 
encompassing political ideology, to finally becoming a pragmatic political 
program. His findings suggest that the shifts in Hezbollah’s ideology are due to the 
alteration that occurred on the local, regional and international scene. He asserts 
that Hezbollah is persistent about pursuing a moderate political program while 
keeping its doctrines in sight. Consequently, and “from time to time” Hezbollah 
puts its ideology aside by following a dynamic program that is very far from 
rigidity. Although Alagha analyses the shift from ideology to pragmatism and 
differentiates Hezbollah’s “thawabit” (constants), unchanged principles, from the 
alteration in Islamic principles however he fails to acknowledge that this transition, 
though temporary, is also instrumental.  
5 
  
 
Amal Saad Ghorayeb acknowledges Hezbollah’s success in creating a 
balance between its intellectual structure and political discourse, for the time being, 
but thinks that the party will have to tip the balance in favor of one or another 
(2002). Ghorayeb concludes her study of Hezbollah by explaining that the party has 
chosen to give its Lebanese identity and role as an influential political force 
secondary status to its Islamic identity. 
            Avraham Sela and Shaul Meshal share the same vision towards Hamas. In 
their book The Palestinian Hamas they aim to show that Hamas’s ideology and its 
long-term goals do not oppose its participation in the political process. In addition, 
Gunning studies the movement’s “success” in the political arena, showing that 
religion, violence and democracy are not totally contradictory. Shai Gruber (2007) 
explores the relationship and tensions between ideology and realpolitik in Hamas’s 
decision making. He outlines Hamas’s positions and actions in the past and 
demonstrates that Hamas is flexible to a certain degree in the implementation of its 
ideology (2007). Gruber once again fails to question the sincerity of this discourse 
on the long run. 
Matthew Levit shares a completely different viewpoint towards Hamas: he 
is more categorical towards this Islamic party. Throughout his book, Hamas: 
Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (2006) he questions how it 
is possible for a group that operates terror cells and espouses political violence to 
become a ruling political party and asserts that Hamas will never undergo an 
ideological transformation. Furthermore, he demonstrates that there are no 
differences between Hamas’s armed wing and its so-called political wing. For him 
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Hamas remains the one and only extension of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 
the occupied territories.  
            This thesis argues that Hamas and Hezbollah’s moderation and inclusion is 
only instrumental, as they cannot have a dual commitment towards “God” on the 
one hand and “people” on the other one. I attempt to do so by describing Hamas 
and Hezbollah’s ideologies and charters and by shedding light on the impact of 
geopolitics on their pragmatic transformation. Therefore, the purpose of my thesis 
is threefold. First it aims to examine both parties’ transformation in order to see to 
which extent they were able to moderate. Second, it attempts to argue that 
moderation is only instrumental as the geopolitical variable may play a significant 
role in influencing both parties’ moderation. Third, it emphasizes on the role of 
geopolitical influences in such alterations, as domestic variables are no longer the 
only determinants of inclusion and consequently moderation. 
 
1.3 Research Questions: 
            How did Hamas and Hezbollah change their ideologies in order to reach 
political pragmatism? The first question is essential in the sense that it will allow us 
to understand the dynamics leading both Hamas and Hezbollah to moderation. 
Even if both parties were aiming to be included respectively in government this 
does not mean they followed the same mechanisms to reach their goals. By 
answering this question I assess how both Hamas and Hezbollah have tried to 
adjust to political developments, which necessitated a reformulation of their 
positions and intellectual structures. It is by comparing and contrasting the means 
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used by both parties that I will show how two radical religious parties have tried to 
adjust to changing circumstances. The politically exclusive and intolerant tones that 
they used eventually paved the way towards a more inclusive and conciliatory 
discourse. 
            The domestic variable surely helped in the shift to pragmatism but is it the 
only important explanatory variable? And what is the role of geopolitics in this 
regard? This thesis suggests that the purported ideological moderation is simply 
instrumental, dictated by changing geopolitical conditions. Both Hamas and 
Hezbollah debated for a long period of time whether to participate or not 
respectively in the Palestinian and Lebanese governments that they had described 
earlier as corrupt. In 1992 however, Hezbollah decided to participate in the 
electoral cycle. One of the most influential Shi‘a clerics, Sayed Mohammed 
Hussein Fadlallah, had espoused a pro-election position for years.  He argued that 
gradual reformation was necessary in the Lebanese context because Islamic rule 
was simply impossible in the diverse Lebanese society. In 2006, Hamas followed 
Hezbollah with shocking electoral victory. Later events such as the 2008/2009 
Hamas Israeli conflicts and Hezbollah’s military take-over of Beirut in 2008 show 
however, that both parties might not have embraced the democratic process 
wholeheartedly. 
1.4 Methodology: 
            A comparative approach is used throughout the thesis in order to determine 
the differences and similarities shaping Hamas and Hezbollah’s path towards 
moderation. Relying on domestic variables alone cannot explain moderation 
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however. Therefore, I will attempt to do so by focusing also and more particularly 
on the geopolitical variables’ effects and role in moderating Islamist parties.  
           The challenge lies in attempting to write the thesis by using a perspective 
that has not been portrayed before. Many scholars have revisited the inclusion-
moderation theory with respect to political Islam. This thesis emphasizes the 
external dynamics or geopolitical variables effect on the inclusion-moderation 
theory for a better understanding of Islamists’ moderation. No one can deny Iran or 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s influence respectively on Hezbollah and 
Hamas. In fact, when looking at the Iran-Hezbollah relation, one cannot neglect the 
fact that Hezbollah’s allegiance is directed to the faqih, on account of his 
transnational authority, but also to the revolutionary state he officially heads 
(Ghorayeb 2002). Nor can anyone neglect the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood 
on Hamas, on the one hand, in addition to its relation with Iran at a certain point in 
time.  A strong affinity exists between Iran and Hamas, not only with respect to 
financing the latter but also by virtue of the Palestinian cause that is essentially an 
Islamic one. The factions’ relation with external entities is mostly intellectual but it 
also reflects on its political choices. My aim is to concentrate on the intellectual 
bonding in order to explain political actions. 
The political discourse is gathered from primary and secondary sources. 
Primary sources include part of Hamas and Hezbollah’s public speeches made by 
high-ranking officials.  Secondary sources are gathered from Hamas and 
Hezbollah’s media (i.e; television, newspapers and newsletters). 
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1.5 Map of the Thesis: 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The next chapter reviews the debate about 
the inclusion-moderation theory with respect to political Islam. The third and fourth 
chapters emphasize respectively the mechanisms that led both Hezbollah and 
Hamas to moderate their positions with a focus on the impact of geopolitical 
variables. As for the fifth and final chapter, it summarizes the lessons learnt and 
contributions of this study. Furthermore, it emphasizes on Hamas and Hezbollah’s 
action with the Arab Spring wave and possibly its aftermath while showcasing that 
moderation is not always a linear process but that it could also be a reverse one 
especially with the presence of a geopolitical variable at stake. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Theory   
2.1- Introduction 
           The challenge of including Islamists in the political process was explored by 
many scholars in the 1980s and 1990s. Debates revolving around whether to 
include or exclude have moved to explore the essence of Islamist extremism and 
moderation. This chapter examines the inclusion-moderation theory with respect to 
political Islamist groups. Revisiting this theory will however remain incomplete if 
we fail to explore the concept of moderation, in addition to the moderate-radical 
dichotomy. What does moderation mean in the beginning and can we talk about a 
radical actor on the way to moderation? Can Islamists moderate or are they trying 
to embrace certain attitudes that do not really fit their true colors? Do they 
moderate their politics because they have come to hold new positions on core 
beliefs and ideological values or do they simply shift their positions, and perhaps 
for a very short period of time, in order to attain political advantages? 
          After discussing many definitions of moderate and radical, and unpacking the 
notion of moderation, in addition to revisiting the scholarly literature with respect 
to moderation in studies of democratization, the chapter will shed light on 
Schwedler’s “Inclusion-Moderation theory” with respect to political Islam. It will 
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explore its three different approaches and discuss the scholarship on political Islam 
that falls within each category. The three different approaches are: the behavioral 
moderation of groups, ideological moderation of groups and ideological 
moderation of individuals.  
 
2.2 Unpacking Moderation 
According to Schwedler, Islamist is a term that is used for highly diverse 
political actors who are undoubtedly the most significant non-state political actors 
in the Middle East (2011). When looking back at the Islamist moderation related 
literature we find that the distinction between radicals and moderates is essential to 
all models. The democratic transition literature suggests that political actors 
supporting an elite-led transition moderate whereas those who put forth demands 
that are revolutionary in support of the masses tend to be labeled as radicals. 
Moving away from the democratic transition literature, the terms “moderate” and 
“radical” designate a stance that is taken either vis-à-vis a political system or 
practices. Moderates are those who seek gradual change while working within the 
existing system. Radicals , on the other hand, are those who seek to overthrow a 
political system while using violence. Consequently, Schwedler suggests that 
scholars emphasizing objectives argue that Islamists seek fundamental alterations 
on the socio/political/economical level. However, scholars focusing on tactics 
suggest that those who seek alteration using purely peaceful measures are moderate 
in comparison with those using violence.  Scholars who embrace the “tactic” 
argument with respect to the radical-moderate distinction seem to fail when it 
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comes to defining the objectives of Islamist parties, however. As a matter of fact, 
when looking at the Muslim Brotherhood we see that it has tried in the past to act 
peacefully while rejecting violence as a means to political change; we tend to forget 
however that its objectives range from peaceful to moderate to the use of violent 
measures vis-à-vis existing political, governmental and economical systems, as the 
case of Hamas suggests. 
          Joshua Stacher suggests that while the many branches of the Muslim 
Brotherhood do not use violent measures to overthrow existing systems, however, 
they support its armed wing Hamas both financially and rhetorically (2009). In his 
article The Brothers and the Wars, he argues that while the Egyptian Brotherhood 
is focused on Egypt, it is also concerned with one major issue: the question of 
Palestine. “During the Gaza war the group and its charity arms attempted to ship 
medical and food aid to the Palestinians only to be blocked by the Egyptian 
military”, he adds (2009). Furthermore, what might seem strange enough is how 
parties such as Hamas and Hezbollah justify the use of violence. Violence becomes 
not only a tool or measure taken vis-à-vis the enemy but also a stance that is 
justifiable when it comes to applying their ideologies.  
           In a study revolving around Muslim rebellion, Mohamed Hafez revisits the 
moderate-radical definition. He explains why institutional exclusion is a 
contributing condition for Islamist rebellion. Throughout his study, he elaborates 
the five propositions that explain patterns of rebellious conduct.  In sum, he finds 
that when the states do not give Islamist opposition movements the opportunity to 
participate, and employ repression vis-à-vis these movements, they will most 
13 
  
 
probably rebel. He adds, that “when they do so, Islamists will organize themselves 
in exclusive, loosely structured organizations that demand strict ideological and 
behavioral adherence from their members…. Such framing of the conflict is 
intended to solidify the divisions between outsiders and insiders, as well as to 
justify and motivate collective violence”.  Hafez explores the case of Egypt and 
Algeria in order to support his argument (Hafez 2003, 200).  
          In a study of Islamist women’s activism entitled “Who Opened the 
Window?” Jillian Schwedler and Janine Astrid Clark ask why women’s 
participation in Jordan’s Islamic Action Front Party and Yemen’s Islah Party has 
increased dramatically over a very short period of time. Their findings show that 
political inclusion has produced better results for moderates rather than hardliners. 
It is over internal party dynamics that those two groups are basically competing. 
The study of Islamist women however, shows that there is a need for a 
“methodological apparatus that captures the positions of key party leaders across a 
range of issues” rather than categorizing the two factions as solely hardliners or 
moderates.  Schwedler and Clark argue that the moderate-radical labels might not 
apply to Islamists’ stances as they might hold moderate views towards some issues 
but radical ones towards many others. Internal politics of all parties include 
complex divides across a spectrum of issues, especially after taking the initial 
decision to participate. Schwedler and Clark emphasize the fact that political actors 
may agree with respect to participation in democratic institutions yet disagree on 
the appropriate role of women. It is in this sense that the existing literature has 
limitations as it refers mainly to “moderate” Islamist as the persons who accept the 
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procedural elements of entering the political scene while disregarding their vision 
of what shape will the Islamic state take- as opposed to “radical Islamists” who 
reject political participation in all its forms. It is worth mentioning that actors who 
agree on one issue cannot be assumed to be on accord on others (Schwedler & 
Clark 2003).  
          In a report entitled “Islamists at the Ballot Box: findings from Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, and Turkey” prepared by the United States Institute of Peace’s grant 
program, Judy Barsalou, summarizes Carrie Wickham’s views regarding  the 
scholarly literature revolving around the role and impact of Islamists in the Middle 
East. Wickham concurs with Schwedler and Clark that much of the literature on the 
Islamist parties is problematic. One of the major problems is that it tends to equate 
the term “moderation” with “growing support for democracy”. Consequently, 
Wickham specifies how the existing literature “fails to acknowledge the possibility 
that Islamist opposition leaders might come to embrace certain aspects of 
democracy while continuing to reject others”. A second major problem with the 
current scholarship is that it tends to view all Islamist parties as “monolithic entities 
supportive of a single interpretation of Islam”. Wickham argues in this respect that 
Islamists share a wide variety of position with respect to strategic political issues 
and “end goals” (2011). 
           In sum, the moderate-radical or hardliner vocabulary remains problematic 
because it labels particular blocs, rather than focusing on discrete policy positions. 
Therefore, it might be more interesting to look at moderation as a process varying 
from radical to moderate rather than a pure category. The process would require 
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some criteria. These include openness to the wide variety of factions, to political 
participation in addition to tolerance vis-à-vis the “other”, and the will to change. 
Of course, some parties show impressive instrumental moderation with respect to 
certain criteria while keeping radical stances with respect to others. For a better 
understanding of the radical-moderate dichotomy, it would be preferable to place it 
within the three models followed by Jillian Schwedler through her revival of the 
inclusion-moderation theory (2011). 
 
2.3- Defining the Inclusion-Moderation Theory 
          Moderation theory posits that inclusion in the political process leads 
extremist groups and parties to abandon violence, integrate and play by the rules of 
the political game. Schwedler articulates moderation theory as the moderation 
inclusion hypothesis because the catalyst for moderation of extremist parties is their 
inclusion in the process. This approach moves away from Samuel Huntington’s and 
Francis Fukuyama’s notion that Islam is inherently undemocratic. Huntington 
pushes it far as to insinuate that Islam as a religion is incompatible with democratic 
institutions, “to the extent that government legitimacy and policy flow from 
religious doctrine and religious expertise, Islamic concepts of politics differ from 
and contradict the premises of democratic politics”. Fukuyama concurs with 
Huntington regarding Islam’s incompatibility with democratic principles. He 
declares in this regard that “Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many 
parts of the Islamic world, posing a grave threat to liberal practices even in 
countries where it has not achieved political power directly” (Fukuyama1992, 45). 
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Asef Bayat refutes Huntington, Fukuyama, and others that Islam is undemocratic. 
He declares that “the question is not whether Islam is or is not compatible with 
democracy or by extension modernity but rather under what conditions Muslims 
can make them compatible” (Bayat 2007, 4). Assuming that Islam is not inherently 
un-democratic, Schwedler emphasizes on three different models determining when 
moderation has taken place while focusing on the mechanisms that led to it; the 
first model being the behavioral model or the behavioral moderation of groups. 
 
2.3.1 The Behavioral Moderation of Groups 
          Schwedler’s first model emphasizes the importance of political opportunities 
and institutions in creating a major shift in the behavior of groups.  As a 
consequence, previously excluded groups aree able to enter the system, while 
shedding their old radical tactics, and following the rules of the new game. 
Schwedler focuses on the scholars who have been tackling the importance of 
behavioral changes in this regard. While some of them have concentrated on the 
role of constraints on movements, others have established that the constraints 
placed on parties who wish to participate have changed their behavior. Schwedler 
retraces the beginnings of the inclusion-moderation theory by shedding light on 
Samuel Huntington’s “participation moderation trade off” (Huntington 1993, 163).  
          Huntington’s theory fails to define moderation as it speculates that 
moderation occurs simultaneously on the behavioral and ideological level. He 
seems to be among the scholars who combine tactics with objectives. He suggests 
that inclusion would pave the way for further moderation. By reaching political 
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openings however, parties would therefore abandon violence and follow peaceful 
measures “in order to achieve power and put through their policies” (Huntington 
1991, 170). 
Schwedler admits that much of the literature around the inclusion-
moderation theory builds on Huntington, in addition to studies revolving around 
socialist and Christian groups that formed in the early 20
th
 century. The comparison 
between Islamists, Christians and Socialists proves that moderation correlates much 
more with struggle to power than religion itself. Like Huntington (1991), Mona el 
Ghobashy (2005), Samer Shehata and Joshua Stachers (2007) draw on the 
importance of behavioral change which in turn leads to moderation of ideology.   
Ghobashy’s study focuses on the metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. She argues that the Ikhwan’s capitalization on Egypt’s sliver of 
electoral competition for seats in parliament, the professional unions and municipal 
councils, has had an especially profound effect on their political thought and 
organization. Consequently, the institutional rules of authoritarian electoral politics 
have led to both organizational and ideological change within the group (Ghobashy 
2005, 374). Shehata and Stacher also succeed in demonstrating how the shifts to 
moderation have produced a set of ideas that go hand in hand with democracy and 
the electoral process, therefore pushing for a behavioral change that would in return 
generate ideological ones. As per Schwedler, Huntington, Ghobashy, Shehata and 
Stacher fail to explain this shift as it merits further examination.  
           Moving away from exploring the shift in moderation of behavior and 
looking at moderation of ideology, Schwedler examines Omar Ashour’s work The 
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Deradicalization of Islamists: Transforming Armed Islamists Movements (2009). 
His comparative study of Islamist groups in Algeria and Egypt revolves around the 
main drive leading Islamists to abandon violence. He explores three different case 
studies. The first case is that of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt between 1951 and 
1973. The second and the third cases are those of the Islamic Group, and the related 
Al Jihad organization.  In order to answer his research question Ashour starts his 
study by defining key terms and concepts of Islamists. By moderate groups, he 
means groups that ideologically accept, at minimum electoral democracy as well as 
political and ideological pluralism. By contrast, he defines radical Islamist groups 
as movements that ideologically reject democracy as well as legitimacy of political 
and ideological pluralism. He uses the term moderation in order to define a positive 
attitude change towards democracy and explores the concept of de-radicalization to 
refer to the process of abandoning violence. In addition to asking “why do radical 
Islamist militants revise their ideologies, strategies and objectives” he also 
investigates what caused the initiation of the Muslim Brotherhood De-
radicalization process. He emphasizes on the process’ three dimensions: behavioral, 
organizational and ideological. Furthermore, he focuses on the success of 
deradicalization in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Jihad and the Muslim 
Group on the one hand, while concentrating on the failure of the Algerian on the 
other one, with the exception of the Islamic Salvation Front.  
          Like other scholars, Ashour focuses on how political opportunities pave the 
way for further moderation that would eventually lead to a shift in the group’s 
orientation. Unlike other scholars, however, he succeeds in examining the shift by 
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presenting four variables at work: state repression, leadership, selective inducement 
and social interaction (Ashour 2009:14-15). Ashour concludes that “Domestic and 
international structural constraint forces several armed Islamist movements to 
initiate the process of change” (12). 
 
 
2.3.2 Ideological Moderation of Groups 
          Schwedler questions the effect of strategic behavioral modification’s effect 
on the ideological orientation of Islamist groups in order to introduce her second 
model: the ideological moderation of groups. While many studies focus on the 
mechanistic causal relationship with ideological moderation resulting from 
behavioral moderation, Schwedler sheds light on other scholars who question the 
causality of this relationship. She focuses on Janine Astrid Clark’s work on the 
inner works of the higher committee for the Coordination of the National 
Opposition Parties in Jordan. It is by analyzing the role of the Islamic Front in the 
Higher Committee that Clark challenges the inclusion-moderation theory. To start 
with, Clark examines closely the interaction between the IAF and the HC regarding 
three political women-related sensitive issues: the amendment of the Honor Crimes 
Law in Jordan, the personal status law giving women greater rights to divorce, in 
addition to the quota promoting women’s participation in parliament. By focusing 
on the IAF’s positions with respect to those issues in addition to its interaction with 
other HC parties, she realizes that the IAF is not willing to compromise thus raising 
awareness regarding cross-party cooperation and the IAF’s moderation. 
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“Cooperation as practiced by the Higher Committee” she argues, “is largely 
coordination between parties on issues where there are established shared 
interests… While cooperation between the IAF and other members of the HC 
extended over a wide array of issues, it did not occur on issues with direct bearing 
upon shari’a law”, Clark also notes.  She argues about the limited role of the Higher 
Committee with the IAF, especially when it comes to the “red lines” of the IAF and 
concludes that political cooperation with the Islamic Front revolved around 
democratic procedures rather than substance. (Clark 2006; 555-556) 
          Similarly, Carrie Wickham shows how Islamist leaders have moderated their 
agendas in order to profit from participation in the political scene throughout the 
process of democratization (Wicham 2004).  She concludes, with respect to her 
studies revolving around Islamist groups in Jordan, Kuwait and Egypt that groups 
in all three countries have embraced democracy “as a set of procedural rules”. They 
showed mixed feelings, however, when it came to support the full range of rights 
incorporated in the western model. As per Barsalou’s report, Wickham argues that 
participation in electoral politics can lead to changes in core values and beliefs 
among Islamists particularly when they have the opportunity to engage in sustained 
cooperation with other secular groups who are also seeking democratic reforms. 
Showing ideological flexibility on issues around which there is a strong consensus 
within Islamist parties might however seem difficult especially when old guard 
leaders show resistance towards changing the group’s mission. Wickham concludes 
by asserting that moderation does not only occur as result of political participation 
and elections. The extent to which moderation occurs at the very core level of 
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Islamic beliefs has to do with four variables: following the party’s own agenda or 
collaborating with other parties who might have different viewpoints regarding 
important issues; whether cross-party cooperation enhances party leaders’ 
receptivity to new ideas; whether new ideas can be justified in terms of the party’s 
valid terminology; and finally, whether circumstances help the party’s auto-
reformers to build up on new ideas within their own movement (2011).  
           Having rejected the fact that strategic cooperation always leads to 
ideological one, Schwedler explores mechanisms leading to ideological 
moderation. In Faith in Moderation she shows how two Islamists parties, Jordan’s 
IAF and Yemen’s Islah Party, have acted differently with respect to political 
inclusion leading to ideological moderation. She bases her study on three factors 
that has led inclusion to affect the ideological moderation of parties: changes in 
public political space; changes in party structures and the creation of a new set of 
ideas governing political practice. A cultural condition has been added at a later 
stage: public debate. These conditions varied between the Yemeni Islah party and 
Jordan’s IAF thus leading to ideological moderation of one party but not the other. 
Schwedler argues that internal party debates may have precisely lead to a shift of 
ideological redlines on the very long run. She argues that only as a result of these 
internal debates did Jordan’s IAF, see a shift in some of the ideological positions, 
thus leading to ideological moderation. “These mechanisms are causal but they are 
interactive rather than unidirectional or path dependent” (Schwedler 2006, 150).  
         Schwedler explores other mechanisms that help create ideological changes: 
Ashour’s concept of the charismatic leader in reinforcing and legitimizing the de-
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radicalization process is one such mechanism. In Islamist De-radicalization in 
Algeria: Successes and Failures, he explores how the Islamic Salvation Army de-
radicalized between 1997-2000, whereas the Armed Islamic Group was not able to 
de-radicalize as successfully (2008). According to Ashour, the AIS had a 
consolidated, charismatic leadership that was not able to de-radicalize. That 
leadership was influential enough to disarm the 7000 militants that made up the 
organization without causing any splits, as well as influencing several hundred 
militants from other militias and factions. The GIA did not have this type of 
leadership. Moreover, the AIS was able to interact with other armed groups, FIS, 
moderate Islamic figures and political parties to support de-radicalization and 
reconciliation. The GIA had very limited interaction” (2009; 3-4). However, 
Schwedler argues that a charismatic leader is not sufficient to produce de-
radicalization. What is more important is the engagement of those leaders in 
debates about ideological commitment that would thus produce ideological 
changes. Moreover, Stacey Yadav focuses on the fact that those debates should be 
public and not only internal (Yadav 2010). In Understanding what Islamists want: 
Public Debate and Contestation in Lebanon and Yemen, Yadav examines 
Hizbullah and the Islah party’s efforts at the transformation of debates respectively 
in Lebanon and Yemen. She devotes a chapter on Hizbullah and Lebanese politics 
where she discusses the party’s shift from once being a resistant party once to 
participating in the Lebanese political order in the “post war moment”. Yadav 
emphasizes Hizbullah’s policy in rendering internal debate a public one: “In 
addition to expanding public debate by previously rendering a previously 
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intracommunal dialogue on service-provision intercommunal, Hizbullah also has 
raised important questions about the scope and mandate of government in a 
confessional polity” (Yadav, 2010).  It goes without saying that Hizbullah’s main 
ideology “resistance”, became after Al Taef accord part of the “governmental 
mandate”. This in turn, reflected not only an intracommunal military attitude but 
also a political one. Resistance, after 2006, turned out from being an 
intracommunal affair to an intercommunal dispute. What seems to be interesting 
for Schwedler however, is whether individuals are genuine in their transformations. 
Thus, she draws the attention on a third model that shows how individuals 
moderate with time. 
  
2.3.3- Ideological Moderation of Individuals 
          Much of Schwedler’s arguments draw on Wickham’s work. Wickham 
redefines the concept of moderation: she views it as a gradual metamorphosis that 
entails the embrace of democratic and liberal values. Her argument hinges around 
the importance of political learning with respect to individual Islamists and groups. 
Despite all the changes that might happen on a group level, Wickham still argues 
that moderation takes place on an individual level: change in views as compared 
with previously stated views. In her study about the Egyptian Wasat, she mentions 
the two variables that have led the party to moderate its ideology: “political 
learning” and “strategic calculations”. Moreover, she notes that the Wasat party is 
interesting “precisely because it is a hard case, in which precipitants of moderation 
are weak and/ or the deterrents of moderation are strong (Wickham 2004). 
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           In addition to Wickham, both Huntington and Nancy Bermeo tackled the 
importance of the concept of political learning. Huntington argues that not only is 
political learning drawn from one’s own experience but also and more particularly 
from the experience of others. Bermeo, on the other hand joins Wickham by 
distinguishing tactical and behavioral changes from cognitive ones: a process 
through which individuals modify their beliefs as a result of drastic environmental 
changes, crises and frustrations (1992). Schwedler then tackles the centrality of 
cooperation in creating ideological changes. While her study concentrates on the 
fact that cooperation is an effect of shifting ideological commitments, Wickham 
views cooperation as the main mechanism producing ideological moderation. 
Wickham however trusts the sincerity of Islamist discourse: for her even if 
Islamists have moderated for purely instrumental reasons, this suggests that their 
positions evolved in order to become principles (Wickham 2008).  
          Ashour also believes in the importance of cooperation on the individual 
level, thus leading to further political learning. For him social interaction would 
definitely lead to changes in behavior and ideas of leaderships: “External social 
interaction aiming to influence Islamist leaders coupled with selective inducements 
could be key factors in de-radicalizing militants groups” (Ashour, 2008). In certain 
cases, governments perceive the elimination of a “spiritual” leader as a victory, not 
knowing that this may eventually make the de-radicalization process less likely to 
succeed.  They fail to acknowledge the necessity of those leaders in legitimizing 
de-radicalization and initiating internal dialogue among the followers (2008). By 
following this approach, Ashour fails in advancing examples where moderation 
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does not occur as a result of further cooperation; and by transitivity, does not 
mention that radicalism can also be acquired through further intra-groups 
cooperation.   
 
2.4- Conclusion 
          This chapter presented a wide variety of definitions of moderation, causality 
arguments, in addition to different mechanisms of sequencing between inclusion 
and moderation. It also explored, many variables leading Islamist parties to 
moderate, such as cooperation, public debate, political learning and leader’s 
charisma, whether on the behavioral or ideological level. While many scholars 
question the behavioral-ideological causality, I submit it to a test, especially with 
the new wave of protests that rose up in the Middle East since January 2011.  In 
Will Islamists become Moderates? Schwedler presents a wide variety of literature 
revolving around the inclusion leading to moderation theory and reformulates it by 
introducing political liberalization as a process that helps in different forms of 
changes, moderation being one of them. Yet, her theory seems to be incomplete as 
she fails to introduce an external variable that is the geopolitical one.  The coming 
chapter will examine how two well-known Islamist parties, Lebanon’s Hezbollah 
and the Palestinian Hamas, have shown signs of moderation despite their 
development in two different contexts, with two ideological starting points, and last 
but not least with different paths towards moderation. The chapter will most 
importantly concentrate on the impact of the geopolitical variable on the 
26 
  
 
modification of behavior and ideologies of Islamist parties such as Hamas and 
Hezbollah. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
The Influence of Geopolitical Variables on Hamas’s 
Moderation 
 
3.1- Introduction 
          When Muslims looked around them in the beginning of the 19
th
 century, they 
started questioning themselves: What went wrong? They were shocked that they 
could not acknowledge the fact of succumbing to someone else’s rule. From being 
at the top in a certain period in history, they discovered that they no longer 
possessed the prosperous, powerful and advanced states that they once had in the 
Ottoman and Mogul empires. In the absence of a Muslim power, and more 
particularly a Caliph, who could guide and protect the Muslim society, some 
individuals felt that they were responsible for their religion and that they had to 
carry Islam’s mission. The Islamic revival was a very normal reaction to the 
collapse of the “Khilafa”, where revival simply meant that religion would 
eventually rise up again as the central belief of societies. It is true that the Islamic 
revival has taken a violent or fundamentalist form in some cases, however, one 
could talk about the Muslim Brotherhood as being a unique case in this regard. This 
chapter examines how the extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied 
territories, Hamas, has been able to show some signs of moderation after being 
included in the political process. It first tackles Hamas’s beginnings, its themes, and 
its objectives in addition to how it rose in power. It focuses on the methods used by 
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the party in addition to its instrumental moderation in order to be included in the 
government. Finally yet importantly, it asserts that geopolitics is the main and 
constant variable behind Hamas’s moderation. 
 
3.2- Hamas’s Beginnings: 
          The Muslim Brotherhood was established to articulate the concept of an 
Islamic state. It was founded by Hassan al-Bana, a school teacher, along with six 
other workers in the Suez Canal city of Isma’ilya in March 1928. During its first 
three years, the Muslim Brotherhood remained a small group; but Al-Banna 
decided to move his small society to Cairo in order to let it grow further. The 
Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine is the extension of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood. In 1935 Al-Banna sent his brother, Abdel Rahman to establish the 
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1945, its first branch was 
inaugurated in Jerusalem and its sources of inspiration were Al-Banna along with 
Sayyid Qutb and Izz al-Dine al-Qassam. Meanwhile, the organization developed its 
activities in Egypt; founded new branches and worked on recruiting people. There 
are no accurate numbers that could permit us to evaluate its popular support back 
then. However, in a study conducted in 1969, Richard Mitchell asserts that by 1949 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s two thousands branches gathered between 300, 000 and 
600, 000 members (Mitchell 1969).  It differed from other organizations though in 
the sense that it combined both the spread of Islam with the concept of moderation. 
The organization’s main aim was to get rid of the secular and western domination 
which it claimed was corrupting the Egyptian as well as the Arab Muslim mind; it 
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argued that true Islam would provide the democratic means to reach such an end. 
Leiken and Brooke stipulate in this regard that “at its beginning the Brotherhood 
differed from other reformers by combining a profound Muslim ideology with 
modern grass-root political activism” (Leiken & Brooke 2007, pp 53-54).Whereas 
the organization’s main objectives were to create a “Muslim individual”, a 
“Muslim family”, a “Muslim society” and of course a “Muslim state” which would 
lead to a “Muslim Khilafa” and therefore to master the world once again under the 
reign of Islam, its main theme revolved around the following: 
“Allah is our objective.  
The messenger is our leader.  
Quran is our law.  
Jihad is our way.  
Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.” 
           (Muslim Brotherhood Movement homepage) 
         The themes and objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian 
territories were quite similar to the Egyptian one. The main aim of its leaders was 
“Islamization first”. Due to the repetitive Israeli invasions of Palestinian territory 
the organization struggled to keep Islamization as its top priorities however, due to 
its recruitment strategies a new stratum of activists developed. It opposed the old 
class Elite in the sense that it wanted to fight Israel along with the process of 
Islamization. Hamas was formed to solve this dilemma (Robinson 2004, 112-139). 
It was founded and headed by Sheikh Ahmad Yassine in 1988 at the beginning of 
the Intifada. The group was “an Islamic organization that believes Islam and Jihad 
provides the means to its ultimate goals: an Islamic state in Palestine” (Caroll 2005, 
4).Hamas’s aim and strategies are clearly defined in a charter it issued on the 18 
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August 1988.The Charter contains its philosophy and its position on central issues 
such as the Palestinian problem, but also towards social welfare, the role of women, 
other Islamic movements, the PLO and the Arab countries. Hamas’s main theme or 
slogan appears also in the charter. It does not differ from the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood’s slogan, but adds to it the duty to fight, for the Palestinian problem is 
a religious problem and each and every individual is called to take part in fighting 
the enemy. 
 
3.3- The Rise of Hamas 
          As previously mentioned, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was facing 
internal problems in the middle 1980s between its young strata, who were eager to 
fight the enemy and its old strata of elite leaders, who were more preoccupied with 
educating society and establishing an Islamic state. It is important to state however 
that the old stratum was mainly constituted from an “urban, upper-middle class of 
merchants”, whereas the new generation consisted primarily of “university-
educated men” belonging to the lower middle class (Robinson). As a result, Sheikh 
Ahmed Yasin’s plan was to create a separate organization, Hamas, that would bear 
all the responsibility for participating in the intifada. Theoretically, both Hamas and 
the Muslim Brotherhood are separate, yet in practice they are intertwined (Abu 
Amr, 1993). No one can deny the fact that many supporters were attracted by 
Hamas’s ideology however; none can dismiss the political as well as economic 
factors which led to its popularity.  
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          The PLO’s shift to pragmatism, during the last decade of the 20th century 
enabled Hamas to fill the ideological and doctrinal vacuum. The PLO was no 
longer the representative of the Palestinians who wanted to regain their lands and 
take their revenge from the Israeli enemy who killed their families and violated 
their territories: Hamas replaced it in this respect. Moreover, Hamas profited from a 
trend toward conservatism spread in the territories with the beginning of the 
intifada. With the increasing conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the latter 
were in need of returning to their roots through Islamic revivalism to fight the 
enemy which represented western norms and values. The regional effects of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran, and Israel’s support for the Islamists against the PLO in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, were additional causes which led to Hamas’s 
popularity. 
          Glenn Robinson states that “Israel viewed the secular Palestine Liberation 
Organization as its main enemy in the occupied lands and followed a divide and 
conquer strategy of pitting the Islamists against the secularists”(2004, 112). This 
gave Hamas more room to grow than the PLO. Furthermore, when the Islamic 
revolution took place in Iran in 1978-1979, people began believing that they could 
really create a change by joining religious groups determined to fight western 
domination or states which are allies to the U.S. Finally, it has always been argued 
that the Oslo Accord is one of the main factors that led to Hamas’s growth. At a 
time when the Palestinian population was trying to liberate their land, the Oslo 
Accord created rising expectations among Palestinians. It was negotiated by the 
PLO in 1993 and gave the Palestinians only some territorial control in both Gaza 
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and the West Bank.  The accord, which aimed at granting Palestinians rights as 
well as a small part of their land and thus create a peaceful atmosphere, backfired 
and led to Hamas’s rise in power at the expense of the PLO.  
          Although Hamas has been committed to the use of violence however, it 
justifies itself by declaring that it is only used as responses to the various massacres 
committed by Israel against the Palestinian people. Even though the use of violence 
can discredit the many other peaceful and positive facets of a party or an 
organization, this was not the case with Hamas due to the context in which it grew. 
The Palestinian society was looking for hope: Hamas was a savior in this regard 
with its readiness to keep on fighting the enemy in the name of God until liberating 
every piece of land and granting Palestinians their rights.  
          Hamas has also profited from the failure of Arab countries to build a fair, 
open and free economic system. It has used this failure in the sense that it was 
capable throughout a short period of time to build a strong network of social 
services. Palestinian society has always been known to be a secular one. Hamas had 
to offer a new strategy in order to gather public support. It is by stressing social 
welfare and, more particularly, on providing people with social services that Hamas 
forged a path that ought to be a successful one. “Cognizant of the lack of public 
support for its position, Hamas used its welfare services to increase its influence 
and popularity at the expense of the PLO” (Gruber, 2007, 5). 
 Nor was Hamas considered a terrorist group by its own people, but rather a 
legitimate and dedicated group struggling to provide people with many types of 
social services through “mosque based-institutions, medical and educational 
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institutions and explicitly political institutions”(Robinson 2004,126). Focusing only 
on Hamas’s use of violence misses the large dynamics of the movement, which are 
better understood in terms of Social Movement Theory. At a time when Fatah and 
the PLO became corrupt, Hamas rose up through its well organized social network. 
Little wonder that Hamas’s sweeping victory in the 2006 elections was a shock for 
all parties, including Hamas itself. Hamas’s aim back then was to win a large 
enough number of seats that would constitute around 40 to 45 % of the total 
number of parliamentary seats. The outcome of the elections was however “a 
sweeping victory” for Hamas who won 60 % of the total number of seats (Tamimi 
2007). 
 
3.4- Uncertain Democracy 
          After exploring the election’s result in addition to the path followed by 
Hamas in the post 2006 elections period it is worth assessing Hamas’s strategies of 
action regarding the issue of political participation. The following is an attempt to 
evaluate the inclusion-moderation theory with respect to Hamas. It is by addressing 
the link between political participation-inclusion and moderation that this thesis 
attempt to examine this topic. It is important to mention that in the case of Hamas 
the sequencing or causality of inclusion and moderation are reversed as the 
ideological and behavioral moderation process began long before Hamas’s victory 
in the electoral system. 
           Meshal and Sela suggest that the scope of political participation and power 
sharing of Islamic movements in the Arab world became a focal point in the 
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1980’s, in the debate on Islam and democracy (2006). The focal point of the debate 
was whether these movements have undergone a normative change in their attitude 
towards liberal democracy or rather exploit opportunities under non-Islamic 
regimes and, most importantly, whether such movements might be willing to accept 
democracy not only during their struggle to attain power but also after gaining it. A 
close study of Hamas’s strategies reveals a similarity to those of other Islamic 
movements in the Arab world concerning participation in the political process. 
Indeed Hamas, like any other Islamic movement, demonstrated at a certain point in 
time its willingness to shorten the process of Islamization by shifting from an 
evolutionary to a political strategy in order to gain power. Shai Gruber asserts that 
“modifying its ideology of Jihad was the only way for Hamas to avoid being 
perceived as an obstructionist force harming Palestinian society” (Gruber 2007, 6). 
Therefore, Hamas was able to generate a behavioral change after being known as a 
radical party. The shift was only instrumental at the very beginning as the party’s 
leaders made use of different interpretations of its charter whenever they felt that 
they were cornered on a domestic, regional as well as international level. Gruber 
suggest that Hamas tried to demonstrate that “the Charter was written cleverly and 
can be interpreted in different ways” (Gruber 2007, 1).  Hamas’s leaders started 
using their Charter’s interpretation according to their own interests. On one hand, 
whenever they felt the need to do so they would revert back to their short-term goal 
or the pragmatic one. Hamas’s short-term goal revolves around ensuring its 
political and military position in Gaza and the West Bank in addition to 
maintaining its strong domestic support and strengthening its international 
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positions. On the other one, whenever they felt powerful their long-term goal based 
on establishing an Islamic state would reemerge. 
           By concentrating on the period that accompanied the Oslo Accord (1993), 
we demonstrate how Hamas reverted to its short-term goals while stressing on the 
notion of Saber or patience. Nevertheless, after the failure of the Accord it reverted 
to its long term goals. The emphasis on violence culminated during the second 
intifada.  Gruber mentions in this respect that “no other Palestinian faction executed 
as many suicide attacks or generated as many casualties among Israelis as Hamas 
during the Intifada’s first year” (Gruber 2007, 7). In the events which followed the 
second Intifada, Hamas had to go back and forth with its pragmatism by acting 
wisely whenever it was confronted on an international as well as regional level. A 
serious attempt to shift to moderation was perceived prior to the elections though. 
Jeroen Gunning argues that “Hamas has scaled down expectations regarding its 
core goals, the creation of an Islamic state, and it has increasingly sought to find a 
pragmatic way out of its absolutist insistence on the liberation of all Palestine”. 
Gunning went further to state that Hamas’s inclusion is important to securing 
democracy in Palestine (Gunning 2004, 252). As it decided to participate in the 
2006 elections, Hamas started planning meticulously and in a later stage executing 
its program: this paved the way to what is known as the “New Hamas”. 
          The “New Hamas” phase was basically reflected in two particularly 
significant documents issued by the movement. The first was the “2005 Electoral 
Platform for Change and Reform”, on which Hamas ran in the elections. The 
second was the “government platform”, formulated after the elections, in which the 
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victorious movement suggested a basis for working on a national unity cabinet. In 
the “Electoral Platform for Change and Reform”, a twenty page document, Hamas 
tried to portray the changes which have took place within the organization by 
showing it was able to develop its strategies, perceptions and priorities. According 
to Khaled Hroub, “Hamas’s electoral platform is closer to Fatah’s outlook than to 
Hamas’s founding principles” (2006). The diminished level of religious content 
was shocking for many especially that Hamas had clearly no idea that it was 
capable of overthrowing the Fatah government in the 2006 elections. Therefore, the 
party was solely appealing to its pre-existing base: The “electoral platform” 
promoted a new Hamas. Yet, it is essential to note that drawing conclusions about 
political parties by emphasizing their election’s program is misleading. Political 
parties try to show their finest political statements at election times, but this does 
not mean that it fully reflects their real convictions. 
           The “Government Platform” was promulgated in March 2006 in order to 
ensure that the party was ready to implement what it advocated during the pre-
elections phase. The second document differed from the first one in the sense that it 
emphasized Hamas’s willingness to work with other Palestinian parties. It was 
carefully drafted and targeted different audiences at the same time. On a global 
level, the movement, now a political party, wanted to show that it was an amicable 
movement. By doing so it tried to penetrate American as well as European 
audiences who were shocked and displeased by its success. On a regional scale, 
Hamas tried to show other Islamist movements and parties that it would still be the 
Hamas they have always known. It also emphasized the fact that it is a moderate 
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government in a bid to reassure Arab regimes of its ramification on their internal 
affairs. On a national scale, Hamas tried to show that it was conducting its ideas 
towards national unity in order to gain a broader Palestinian audience and reassure 
its national counterparts. All in all, the “government platform” constituted a real 
turning point in Hamas’s political thinking as it tried to tackle the conflict with 
Israel by using a language borrowed from international laws and conventions in 
addition to focusing on the two-state solution concept. Hroub argues that Hamas 
used an appealing and “carefully crafted language” in the post-election period in 
order to show that it is not a “belligerent and war loving movement (Hroub 2010, 
152)”. 
        Hamas undertook a huge step towards moderation. It tried to appeal to a 
bigger audience by making ideological and behavioral concessions. Not only did 
Hamas stand against its own raison d’etre by agreeing to join the PLO, whose 
driving force is secularism, it also endorsed a two-state solution and agreed to 
cooperate with previous international treaties and peace conventions. Its efforts, 
however, were unremarkable due to the international media focus on Hamas 
rejection of the Quartet’s demands. To be sure, the Hamas of 2006 is different from 
the Hamas that had been formed twenty years earlier. It is a Hamas that is 
committed to the political process; a Hamas that was able to redefine itself and its 
role within Palestinian society. A clear depiction of Hamas’s behavior in the post-
2006 elections will allow us to determine whether its inclusion paved the way to its 
moderation. 
3.5- Hamas in Power 
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          While some scholars viewed Hamas’s electoral victory as a path towards 
pragmatism and moderation, others undermined the fairness of the elections and 
took it as proof that Palestinians could not be trusted and that Israel should use all 
possible means to ensure its boarders’ safety. Levit goes as far as to question how 
the world would understand and react towards Hamas that was brought up in the 
2006 elections. He argues that no distinction should be made between Hamas’s 
armed and political or social wing. He emphasizes that “a review of the evidence 
regarding the integration of Hamas’s political activism, social services and 
terrorism demonstrates the centrality of the group’s overt activities to the 
organization’s ability to recruit, indoctrinate, train, fund, and dispatch suicide 
bombers to attack civilian targets” (Levit 2006, 3). Levit urges the international 
community to take the lead; his prayers were directly answered. 
          Despite Hamas’s legal right to rule, its hold on power faced a multitude of 
challenges, including an international economic blockade and increased Israeli 
reprisals. The truth is that in the post 2006 elections Hamas tried to implement what 
it was preaching in its political program. Immediately after its election, it 
announced a “unilateral truce” and hoped that the Israeli government would 
reciprocate by negotiating a long-term agreement. The American government 
responded to Hamas’s success by stressing the fact that they would not recognize 
Hamas’s government unless it complies with three conditions: recognizing Israel, 
renouncing violence and accepting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. 
However, having been elected on a democratic basis, Hamas’s members felt that 
they should have been given the chance to implement their electoral “platform on 
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change and reform” without prior conditions. When Hamas demonstrated no signs 
of complying, the US/EU/Israel started taking actions in order either to oblige it to 
change its position or to face international and regional isolation.  Various tactics 
were used in order to bring out one of those outcomes.  
          Many countries were pressured to withhold recognition from Hamas and stop 
dealing with it (Tamimi 2007). This tactic failed though as the majority of Arab and 
Islamic states showed their willingness to invite and visit Hamas. In addition to 
Turkey and Russia, the members of Hamas’s political bureau visited and held talks 
with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, 
Oman, Algeria, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. Nevertheless, the members of Fatah 
were determined to undermine Hamas’s power. On Monday 13 February 2006, few 
days before Hamas took control of the legislature, Fatah’s members gathered and 
decided to grant Mahmud Abbas new powers. Abbas was given the authority to 
appoint a new Constitutional Court. This constitutional court, which consists of 
nine judges, was empowered to solve all the disputes between Abbas and the new 
Hamas elected government. Moreover, the legislators appointed Fatah’s members 
to four key posts. Hamas described all those actions as being “illegitimate” and the 
whole procedure as being a “bloodless coup”.  It rejected Fatah’s decision at its 
first session on Monday 6 March, thus pushing Fatah’s members to leave the 
session and boycott the rest of it. In another bid to weaken Hamas, Abbas tried to 
pressure Fatah’s members in order not to join the government that Hamas had 
hoped would be a government of national unity. Not only did Fatah want its 
members to boycott Hamas’s government,  it also laid down two conditions that 
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Hamas should meet; one of them revolved around Israel’s recognition and its right 
to exist, and the second one being recognition of the PLO’s claim to be “the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”. Neither condition was accepted 
by Hamas, which started establishing a government on its own. Therefore, Abbas 
worked on forming a parallel government whose policies were opposed to that of 
the newly elected government. Having the full support and financial backing of the 
international community, he was able to claim exclusive control of the police 
forces, of various media outlets, and spread his control over the crossing points 
between Israel and the occupied territories. 
           The economic sanctions imposed by the International community were the 
most painful measures taken against Hamas: having inherited from Fatah a huge 
bureaucracy with at least 160,000 employees, with practically no funds and 
virtually no means of generating money, Hamas was thus cornered. Employees and 
their families were being punished in an attempt to rebel against the Hamas 
government. Peaceful protests soon escalated turning into sabotage acts directed 
towards the government. It did not take much time for these protests to turn into 
armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah. Since economic sanctions were not 
enough to break down the Hamas-led government, violent actions were taken to 
overthrow it. On the one hand, Fatah tried to weaken Hamas, while on the other 
hand, and as conflict persisted between the two factions, Israel tried to reinforce the 
conflict by firing shells into Gaza. Its actions were not limited to the assassination 
of different Palestinian activists but also to targeting different civilian spots. After 
shelling a family out on a picnic on a north Gaza beach and wiping out practically 
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all the family members on 9 June 2006, Israel succeeded in pushing Hamas to 
retaliate. It is true that Hamas tried to show the whole world that it was committed 
to its political platform, yet observers were proven right. Undermining Hamas both 
from within and without made the party hold on to its violent tendencies and 
Islamic ideals instead of progressing towards moderation.  
          In the post elections period, Hamas struggled to maintain its pragmatism. 
However, international pressures as well as national ones challenged the political 
party and provoked it into calling off its sixteen months truce. Khaled Hroub argues 
in this respect that the party has long tried to show its ability to shift to moderation 
as shown per its behavior and acts on the ground. He noted however that “with the 
ever mounting external pressures on Hamas, in the form of both ceaseless Israeli 
attacks on the Palestinians to embarrass the government and of United states led 
western cutting of aid to the Palestinian people and effort to isolate the government, 
the chances of aborting the natural development of a new Hamas appear great” 
(Hroub 2006, 27). Some of the commanders of the Ezz el-din el-Qassam Brigades 
had already been demanding a change of policy believing that Israel’s attacks 
should not go unanswered.  Some of them had by then lost confidence in the 
viability of a political process. Hamas’s leadership continued to urge its 
commanders to restrain themselves from military attacks while emphasizing the 
importance of making the government work despite all obstacles. Yet, the massacre 
of the Gazan family reminded them of their previous duty in resisting the enemy.  
          Different Palestinian factions decided to put aside resistance for a while by 
concentrating on the importance of a dialogue promoting national unity. President 
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Abbas himself accepted to answer Prime Minister Ismail Hanya’s call for resuming 
dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. While continuing to deny Israel’s right for 
recognition, Hamas agreed on rectifying several components related to its relation 
with the PLO as well as in terms of accepting an “Arab initiative” which would 
work on consolidating relations between both parties. Israel, however, regarded this 
document as being worthless as if it was planning to widen its spectrum by 
launching a greater war on Hamas. On 24 June 2006, two members of Hamas were 
kidnapped. In return, and in less than 24 hours, the Ezz el-Dine el-Qassam Brigades 
launched a raid against Israel, killing two Israeli soldiers, wounding four and 
kidnapping Gilad Shallit, a nineteen year-old corporal. Following those actions it 
was therefore clear that Hamas was drifting far apart from its political “pragmatic” 
conviction. Israel answered by kidnapping and detaining 64 Hamas officials on 29 
June in addition to launching a series of rockets in Gaza’s direction for a period of 
twelve weeks.  
          Attention focused on Lebanon for a while and more particularly towards 
Israel’s 2006 war on Hezbollah. This did not last long though as Fatah ordered its 
armed men to take over Gaza by force since it was not able to persuade Hamas’s 
leaders to accept international demands nor to convince Palestinians to turn against 
the government. Hamas’s political wing was afraid that things might get out of 
control as its military wing was slowly but surely drawn into the battle ground. 
President Abbas’s call for early parliamentary elections pushed Hamas and Fatah’s 
supporters to confrontation. Despite the enormity of US backing for the campaign 
against Hamas, Fatah was not able to proceed further at that point in time. On 8 
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February 2007 and after two days of extremely hard negotiations between the two 
parties, the Mecca Accord was born under the umbrella of Saudi Arabia. On the 
one hand, it signaled the beginning of the end of Hamas’s isolation, while on the 
other hand it underscored the importance of initiating a dialogue between all 
Palestinian factions and constituting a national unity government. Hamas and Fatah 
needed this agreement direly: the former in order to avoid the possibility of a civil 
war which could have damaged its reputation among people who voted for it, and 
the latter to enhance both its credibility and authority. The pact did not succeed in 
channeling the flow of aid and did not last, however. Clashes between the two 
groups escalated again until gunmen loyal to Hamas took control of Gaza in a short 
battle. Highly trained, heavily armed Fatah security apparatuses collapsed with 
extremely astonishing speed. In order to justify its act Hamas stressed the fact that 
it was not fighting Fatah but rather all those who in the name of Fatah undermined 
the national unity government. One of the US administration’s critics, David 
Wurmser, once VP Dick Cheney’s chief Middle East advisor, believes that Hamas 
had no intentions to take over Gaza until Fatah forced its hand. “It looks to me that 
what happened wasn’t so much a coup by Hamas but rather an attempted coup by 
Fatah which was pre-empted before it could happen” (Wurmser 2008).  
          Hamas’s use of violence against its opponents made it an object of fear in 
Gaza. Beverley Milton-Edwards suggests that “Hamas’s version of Islamic 
governance is not palpable unless as an expression of authoritarian tendencies and 
the advocacy of draconian Muslim norms and values, something of which many of 
Gaza’s Muslims reject. This undermines many of Hamas’s rhetoric about its 
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democratic credentials and leaves it vulnerable on the long term” (2008). What 
seemed to be an optimistic beginning for Palestinian politics, turned out to become 
an uncontrolled situation as the chasm between Hamas and Fatah expanded and 
eventually led to a divided government. 
           Hamas was now in sole control of a territory but a very poor one, and the 
situation in Gaza deteriorated quickly. Israel sealed off its borders and Hamas 
remained defiant while increasing the number of rocket attacks within Israel. For 
months, a heavy cycle of Hamas rockets followed by Israeli raids took place. By 
June 2008, Israel and Hamas were both committed to reach an agreement, and a six 
months truce began. Hamas was subsisted for stopping rocket attacks on Israel and 
making sure that other armed groups commit to the same agreement as well. Hamas 
succeeded largely in halting rocket attacks and it even imprisoned some of those 
who were firing rockets. After the truce lapsed on December 19
,
 all factions started 
firing rockets again with almost 60 rockets falling on Israeli border towns on 
December 24
 
alone. On the 27 of December 2008 Israel started an aircraft attack on 
Gaza targeting not only military but also and more particularly Hamas’s 
infrastructure. This was followed by an open ground war which finally ended on 18 
January 2009, when Israel, followed by Hamas announced a unilateral ceasefire.  
         It is essential to note that since 2007 Hamas has been in total control of the 
Gaza strip. However, it was only able to do so following a series of bloody clashes. 
The two years that followed demonstrated that with respect to its relation with 
Israel, Hamas has also made use of violent methods. In the 2009-2011 period, 
Hamas and Fatah were able to sign a historic and reconciliatory pact in Cairo, while 
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vowing a common cause against Israeli occupation. The emerging signs of 
cooperation did not last long, however. Hamas came out against President 
Mahmoud Abbas’s decision without prior notice, to seek recognition of a 
Palestinian state from the UN in September 2011.  
          The inclusion-moderation hypothesis has failed with respect to Hamas. 
Throughout the 2006-2010 period, and right after its inclusion in the political 
process, Hamas tried to show signs of moderation. The depiction of events that 
followed its success in the elections showed that Hamas, although moderate in 
certain instances, reverted back to its violent means and rigid ideology following 
certain circumstances.  
          Mishal and Shela affirm that Hamas’s structure suffers from different 
intrinsic limitations in ensuring a viable base of support for its strategy of political 
adjustment (2006). For them, if Hamas succeeds in shifting to pragmatism without 
being criticized for deviating from Islamic dogmas and Palestinian nationalist 
norms, this would be the result of the political environment rather than Hamas’s 
own institutions. Arguably, therefore political changes taking place on an 
international, regional and even local level could weaken Hamas’s ability to 
maintain a strategy of “political adjustment and pragmatic thinking” (Mishal and 
Shela 2006, 152). The next section emphasizes that the inclusion-moderation 
theory would be more complete when introducing a new variable, which is the 
geopolitical one. Geopolitics plays an important role in explaining the process of 
moderation in Hamas’s post-election era. 
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3.6- Geopolitics and Hamas’s Moderation: 
           The 2006 Hamas led-coup d’état, and the 2009 Israeli infiltration into the 
Gaza Strip shifted the world’s attention to the ongoing conflict between Israel and 
the Palestinian Hamas. While international media and observers focused on the 
clashes between Hamas and Israel, Israel found the battle of greater importance and 
looked at it from a different perspective as it was confronting a third party and 
outside actor: Iran. It is thus important to understand why Hamas reverted back to 
violent means after its electoral victory. This section does so by examining the 
three phases oh Hamas’s ties with Iran. 
          The Hamas-Iran relationship followed three particular stages. In the 1980s, 
the ties were very limited as Iran was preoccupied by the post-Shah period and 
mainly focused on exporting the revolution and creating Shi’a proxies in the region 
to grow its a transnational power. Gabriel Tabarani states that “due largely to the 
sectarian differences, Hamas had little to do with Iran. Back then, Hamas also 
bristled at Iran’s support for its rival, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which openly 
challenged Hamas for popular support in the Palestinian street” (Tabarani 2008, 
142).    
          Hamas’s relationship with Iran grew stronger in the 1990’s and more 
particularly in 1992, as a Hamas-led delegation visited Tehran to meet Islamic 
Republic’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and other important Iranian 
figures. From that moment onwards, the relationship between Iran and Hamas grew 
stronger as both were joined by their involvement in the geopolitics of the peace 
process. Elie Rakhess emphasizes that from that point onwards the cooperation and 
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coordination between Iran and the Palestinian Hamas became tighter and more 
pronounced (1995). This cooperation was formalized in an agreement signed at the 
end of 1992 in the city of Qum. Because of this agreement, Hamas was able to 
open a bureau for its political activities in Tehran. In return, Iran started treating 
Hamas as its sole representative in Palestinian lands.  
          The third phase of the Iran-Hamas relation began in 2000. Many events such 
as the second Palestinian intifada, the American invasion of Iraq, Yasser Arafat’s 
death and the 2006 electoral victory changed the dimensions of the relation 
between Iran and Hamas. Meyrav Wurmser notes that “all those events proved 
once again to Iran that Hamas can be a powerful tool to help Iran realize its quest 
for regional domination” (2007). In return, Hamas has also benefited from its ties 
with Iran especially after winning the 2006 elections and being isolated by the 
international community. Iran in that sense filled Hamas’s need of external strategic 
support. In December 2006, the Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Hanya admitted 
that “Iran constituted strategic depth for the Palestinians” (Haaretz, 10 December 
2006, 1). 
        Iran’s aid to Hamas is significant to the point that Hamas could not have 
succeeded military and politically had it not been for Iranian financial and technical 
support. Reports state that since 1993, Iran has provided Hamas an annual subsidy 
of approximately USD 30 million in addition to military training (Wurmser 2007). 
This financial and military aid increased after the 2006 elections. During this visit 
to Iran immediately after the 2006 elections, Khaled Meshal acknowledged that 
Hamas would keep on pushing a common agenda, namely “advancing radical 
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Islam”. In the months that followed, and as per Hamas’s spokesperson, Iran sent 
aid to Hamas, it was also ready to pay for its deficit. Iran also granted Hamas the 
amount of USD 250 million in order to compensate for the western boycott. In the 
Iran-Hamas alliance, a study conducted by the Hudson Institute, Wurmser 
emphasized the fact that Hamas’s security force commander, Jamal Ismail Al-
Daoud, further announced that Iran was ready to train Hamas militants in its police 
training camps. The Iranian Support for Hamas, a study conducted by the 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage 
and Commemoration Center, stresses the fact that Iran provided “weapons, 
technological know-how, advanced training in Iran, several hundred million USD 
and political and propaganda support, in the two years which proceeded operation 
Cast-Lead. Iran tends to invest $ 250 million more in order to upgrade the 
organization’s political and armed wings (Petty 2008, 204). 
          Iran’s support for the Palestinian intifada has been steady. It is rooted in 
strategic, ideological and political factors explain why Iran organizes the 
conference. “It is not just ideology or charity that motivates Iran”. The creation of a 
Palestinian state would contribute to Iranian security (2006). Iranian support for 
Hamas, in-spite of the Shia-Sunni divide is a logical extension of Iran’s geopolitical 
objectives. Iran’s support to Hamas and Hamas’s willingness to serve Tehran’s 
geopolitical objectives, suggests that the party’s moderation was only words on 
paper. The two years that followed operation Cast-Lead, determined how the 
geopolitical variable might also bring Hamas to moderate. It is true that Hamas had 
a great deal of ambivalence in terms of partnering with Iran, as Hamas is the 
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extension of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian territory, yet, Tehran soon 
became Hamas’s patron as it filled its ideological and financial vacuum.  
           
3.7- Conclusion 
          This chapter argued that Hamas’s moderation has been largely guided by 
geopolitical variables regardless of its inclusion in the government and its 
commitment to the political process. The next chapter examines how Lebanon’s 
Hezbollah has shown signs of moderation despite its development in a different 
context than Hamas, with a different ideological starting point, and last but not least 
with a different path towards moderation. The chapter will most importantly 
concentrate on the impact of the geopolitical variable on the modification of 
Hezbollah’s behavior and ideologies.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Geopolitics and Hezbollah’s Moderation 
4.1 Introduction 
Hezbollah’s emergence into the political scene was part of the bigger 
explosion of Islamist politics into Middle East.  A series of crises including the 
defeat of Arab states by Israel, socioeconomic imbalances, the end of the Arab 
nationalism era, and political oppression all contributed to the rise of Islamist 
politics. The change that took place in Iran during the 1970s is intrinsically linked 
to the birth of Islamist parties throughout the region, especially in Lebanon where it 
led to the creation of a new giant on the sociopolitical scene, with a comprehensive 
program regarding the future of the country. This agenda was not only confined to 
the borders of the Lebanese state; it also shaped the geopolitical map of the Middle 
East as a whole. 
           “The lessons of the Islamic revolution rippled throughout the region, 
especially in the Gulf states, the West Bank and Gaza, but it had its more direct and 
profound impact on the circle of young Lebanese Mullas who formed Hezbollah, 
who identified with the revolution’s ideology and embraced the principle of 
government by the Supreme Jurist (Harik, 2004, 16). Hezbollah’s origins, theology 
and ideology thus stem from the Iranian revolution and their allegiance is directed 
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towards Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini and, after his death, Ayatollah 
Ali Khamenei. 
          Is Hezbollah a direct extension of the Iranian Islamic revolution in Lebanon? 
Did it apply the agenda it principally announced when it was born? How did the 
party move to pragmatism? Did inclusion pave the way to its moderation or did the 
geopolitical variable play a role in this respect? This chapter focuses on 
Hezbollah’s origins, ideology and its rise to power. It will show how this party has 
been able to enter the political scene by changing its radical face and transforming 
itself from being, at a certain point in time, a violent militia to a moderate political 
party but with a sophisticated military arsenal. It will emphasize the fact that 
inclusion in the political process is not the only path to moderation. Rather 
geopolitics may also play an important role in this party’s moderation or its 
reversal.  
 
4.2 Hezbollah’s Origins: 
          Hezbollah, or “the party of God”, was founded in 1982.  It first gathered 
young Lebanese revolutionaries, some of them barely in their twenties, who were 
dedicated to fighting Israel. Among those men, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, an ex-
Amal representative in his southern village of Al-Bazuryah, who was only twenty-
two years old when he joined Hezbollah. Raghib Harb, also a young resistant leader 
in the South, was thirty at the time of the 1982 Israeli invasion. And Sheikh Subhi 
Tufayli, was only thirty-four at the time. Tufayli became Hezbollah’s first 
Secretary General in 1989. Iran played a leading role in sponsoring the young 
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guerilla’s movement, as it served as a bridgehead for its geopolitical interest and 
ideology in Lebanon. Syria allowed Iran to create this bridgehead in an attempt to 
balance against Israel’s growing power after the 1982 invasion. Hezbollah’s 
creation was thus part of Iran’s campaign to spread the message of the “Islamic 
revolution” (Norton, 2007). 
          On 19 February 1985, Hezbollah issued its Open Letter following a series of 
military and political successes: among them the role it played in the departure of 
the US Marines from Lebanon. This document is essential in order to understand 
the image that the party wanted to project regarding its position in Lebanon and the 
region, as well as its undying loyalty towards the principles of the Islamic 
revolution in Iran. It will also serve as a basis for comparison with future 
announcements and political programs that the party would undertake. The “Open 
letter”, commonly known as Hezbollah’s program was directed to “All the 
oppressed in Lebanon and the World”. It displayed a strong “made in Teheran 
coloration” and was designated to mark the one-year anniversary of the 
assassination of Sheikh Raghib Harb (Norton 2007, 35). The manifesto was read by 
spokesman Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Amine in the Al-Ouzai mosque and reflected the 
views of Hezbollah’s founders in addition to the political thinking of its mentor 
cleric Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah. It discussed the party’s identity and its 
objectives (The Jerusalem Quarterly 1988). 
          “We are often asked: Who we are, the Hizballah, and what is our identity? 
We are the sons of the Umma, the party of God, the vanguard of which was made 
victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the basis of a 
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Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one 
leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and jurist who fulfills all the necessary 
conditions Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini: God save him” (Norton, 1985). The 
document, and most importantly the section dedicated to describing the party’s 
identity, emphasized that the Iranian revolution constituted a source of inspiration 
of what can be accomplished for the Umma under the banner of Islam. Moreover, it 
focused on the importance of the rule of the jurist, or wilayat al faqih, in laying 
down the rules of conduct that should be followed by the party’s members. 
Consequently, the faqih or jurist is not only an Iranian national leader but also a 
pan-Islamic leader of the Umma as well. In return, the Umma, Hezbollah included, 
has to abide by political nationalism while committing itself to intellectual pan-
Islamism. In practice however, the faqih holds limited political authority, and “his 
authority is confined to strategic issues such as Jihad, political rule and the 
classification of friends and enemies” (Saad-Gorayeb 2002, 67). One example of 
this is the faqih’s views with respect to politically driven suicide. Hezbollah was 
able to include martyrdom as part of its military strategy since it was officially 
sanctioned and approved by the jurist. In fact, among the very important notions 
that appear in the “Identity” section of Hezbollah’s open letter is the one revolving 
around holy war, for every member is a fighting soldier who should accomplish his 
duties by fighting under the tutelage of the “Commanding Jurist” when needed. 
“Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of us 
undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within 
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the framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent”(Norton 
2007, 38).  
          Under the title of “Our fight”, the document divides the world into 
“oppressors” and “oppressed”. Saad-Ghorayeb suggests the fact that it is the 
attitude to Zionism and the West, America more in particular, that differentiates the 
oppressors from the politically oppressed. Therefore, the occupation of one’s land 
by Israel or any foreign power is considered to be a principal determinant of 
oppression. Consequently, those whose land is occupied will be granted 
Hezbollah’s full support. Apart from Israel, the US occupies the most hated 
category of Hezbollah’s enemies. “It is followed by the tyrannical regimes 
governing the oppressed whose subservience to the West and the US especially, in 
addition to their inherent injustice as dictatorships translates into oppression” 
(Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 21).  
          The category of the oppressors includes not only Israel and the US, but it also 
includes the Phalangists, Amin Gemayel’s (1982-1988) regime and the Lebanese 
sectarian system. Gemayel was branded a “Butcher”, and his regime, “oppressive” 
and “hypocritical”. The political system in which it operated is viewed in equally 
contemptuous terms (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 26), as Hezbollah felt that the 
“domination of a certain Christian sect that was thought to have lost its majority by 
the 1970’s, was a problem for many Lebanese and especially for the Shiites who 
believed that their own community had become the largest group in the country” 
(Saad-Ghorayeb 2002, 21). Moreover, the principle of political sectarianism can 
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never achieve justice in the eyes of the party. It is rather an imbalanced system that 
promotes corruption because of its unfair division of power. 
                  In the 1985 Open Letter, Hezbollah named its enemies, chose its 
friends, categorized itself among the oppressed, and paved its way to attaining an 
Islamic state by using violent means in case it was forced to do so. The remaining 
sections in its open letter were dedicated to the Christians, to the world scene and 
finally to the importance that shall be dedicated to Israel’s destruction. Hezbollah 
stresses the fact that it has no evil intentions towards the Christians and invites 
them to embrace Islam by “opening their hearts to the da’wa”. It shows the 
similarities that both the Soviet Union and the US share, as both capitalism and 
communism fail in laying the foundation for a just society. Last but not least, it 
stresses its hatred to Israel in addition to the necessity of fighting the later till the 
end.  
         A question, which remains unanswered in Hezbollah’s Open Letter, revolves 
around the form of political design the party wishes to follow after liberating 
Lebanon from both external and internal domination. It is worth mentioning that 
this letter is a programmatic document as it does not reveal all the components of 
Hezbollah’s ideology. It is a manifesto, as Hamzeh describes it, that evokes a broad 
appeal rather than an explanation of Hezbollah’s ideology and its mode of action 
(Hamzeh 2004, 27). Therefore, “Whether the goal is clerical rule under the concept 
of Wilayat al-Faqih, the creation of an Islamic republic on the Iranian model, is not 
made clear in the open letter” (Norton 2007, 39). The next section focuses on the 
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party’s performance and its violent acts in the period varying between the 1982 
Israeli invasion and its first encounter with the political scene in 1992. 
 
4.3 The Pre-Inclusion Phase 
          Analyzing and describing Hezbollah’s development since its foundation, one 
cannot help but notice the presence of two divergent phases in the party’s history. 
The first one can be described as being the violent one as it revolved around 
resistance and armed struggle. This phase opened with the alleged car bombing of 
the U.S embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983, which left 63 dead. The bombing, 
argues Hariq, occurred at a very opportune time as Beirut CIA operatives were 
meeting there with members of the same organization from across the region 
(2004). Another attack occurred on October 1983, leveling the U.S Marine barracks 
near the Beirut airport. Simultaneously, another car bombing occurred, leaving 58 
members of the French contingent dead.  The French contingent, like the American, 
was part of the Multinational Force, brought to Beirut in order to ensure stability 
after the 1982 Israeli invasion (Norton 2007). After the October suicide bombings, 
the Marines and the MNF withdrew from Lebanon. The attacks were claimed by 
the shadowy Islamic Jihad, but the US has always blamed Hezbollah for them. 
Further investigations led by the American government blamed Iran for the 
bombings and described the acts as “Acts of War”. 
          Meanwhile, the kidnapping of civilians, which started directly after the 1982 
Israeli invasion, continued throughout a ten-year period. The act of kidnaping 
American and other westerners living in Lebanon aimed at eliminating the presence 
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of foreigners in addition to disrupting western intelligence networks. Among the 
kidnapped were David Dodge, the acting president of the American University of 
Beirut, Terry Wait, a representative of the archbishop of Canterbury, Army Lt 
colonel William Higgins, whom Hezbollah suspected as being a CIA agent 
operating with UNIFEL and many others.   
          Norton argues that Lebanon was a site for proxy wars in the 1980s. Syria, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, France, Israel, the Soviet Union and the U.S supplied Lebanese 
factions with political and military aid. (2007) Syria and Iran agreed to coordinate 
their attacks against Western interests in Lebanon. Harik contends that “A clear 
arrangement with Syria that incorporated Jihad against the Israelis by Lebanese 
Shiites fundamentalists provided the framework for Iran to actualize its strategy in 
Lebanon” (2004, 39). Over the years, and as Hezbollah grew more powerful, the 
Syrian regime tried to contain the party. Assad looked at Iran and its protégé with 
suspicion in 1987, when Hezbollah fighters refused to remove a checkpoint upon 
the orders of Syrian troops who entered Beirut after clashes with two pro-Syrian 
militias: Amal and the PSP. The Syrian officer in charge shot the Hezbollah 
fighters who were at the checkpoint. This underscores the point that the tripartite 
relationship was not always smooth. In fact relations between Syria, Hezbollah and 
Tehran exploded in 1985-1988 with the Camp wars and then the struggle between 
Hezbollah and Amal on the Southern suburbs. The “three-sided relationship” only 
became closer after the civil war (2004).  
 
4.4 The Transition Phase 
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          The internal and external dynamics of the civil war helped in the rise and 
development of Hezbollah and so did the Syrian-Iranian pact. However, how did 
Hezbollah manage to integrate into the Lebanese political system? Moreover, did 
this moderate the party’s ideological and political stance?  
The first phase that marked Hezbollah’s integration to the Lebanese system 
ended in 1989 with the triumph of the pragmatic camp. Its manifestation was felt at 
the leadership level whereby Abbas el-Mussawi succeeded Subhi el-Tufaili and the 
party decided to contest the 1992 parliamentary elections (Salloukh and Mikaelian, 
14). The end of the Lebanese civil war did not signal the end of Hezbollah as some 
had suspected. On the contrary, the party rose in influence due to the Syrian 
political ascendancy in Lebanon. The role that Syria played in Lebanon in the 
aftermath of the civil war allowed Hezbollah to continue its military activities 
against Israel under the umbrella of the Lebanese state. Hezbollah became a 
somewhat legitimate party and its jihadist activities were thus perceived as part of 
the struggle against the Israeli enemy and were used to serve Syria’s geopolitical 
objectives vis-à-vis the Arab Israeli conflict. 
Not only did Hezbollah accommodate itself to Syria’s control over 
Lebanon, it also disregarded the massacre of Hezbollah members by Syrian troops 
on 24 February 1987. The party “shelved aside its earlier rejection of the Ta’if 
Accord, and accepted the postwar division of roles imposed by Damascus on the 
Shi’a community by which Hezbollah was granted monopoly over the armed 
resistance against Israel” (Salloukh and Mikaelian, 14). Hamzeh contends that 
Hezbollah showed a great deal of political accommodation in the aftermath of the 
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Lebanese civil war. One way it integrated itself into the postwar order was by the 
establishment of a social services network that penetrated all the Shi’a communities 
in the South, Baalbeck-Hermel region and even the Beirut suburbs (Hamzeh, 
2004). Social services increased at the same pace as militant activities in the 1980s 
and 1990s, with Hezbollah keeping its status as political organization. Social 
activities revolved around different spheres such as education, reconstruction of  
houses that were destroyed during previous and multiple Israeli wars and last but 
not least around the extension of  financial aid to the families of the injured and 
martyred Hezbollah fighters.  
          As per the table below, Hezbollah’s social unit comprises four organizations: 
the Jihad Construction Foundation, the Foundation for the wounded, the Martyrs 
Foundation in addition to the Khomeini Support Committee. The Jihad 
Construction foundation or Jihad el-Bina is a very important NGO. It is responsible 
for infrastructure construction. It became indispensable in the aftermath of the 2006 
war against Lebanon as it participated in assessing the damages and paid 
compensation to the residents of Southern Lebanon and Beirut’s Southern Suburbs 
(Flanigan and Abdelsamad 2009, 2). The Islamic Health and Education Units have 
an equally important role in meeting the needs of poor Shi’a at the health and 
educational levels. 
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Table 4.1: Hezbollah organizational chart for social services  
 
By establishing this great web of social institutions, Hezbollah was able to 
portray itself as a social movement that speaks for the disenfranchised. It is in this 
sense that we can consider this phase as being a transitional phase. By creating 
these social institutions Hezbollah was able to survive in the aftermath of the 
Lebanese war against Israel. “One factor that helped Hezbollah to play a stronger 
political role in society and transform itself from a military actor into a political 
party was its provisions of healthcare and social services” (Flanigan and 
Abdelsamad 2009, 2). Effectively, what makes this party a unique one is the scope 
of services in comparison with other Lebanese parties and fundamentalist 
organizations (Hariq 2004, 81). The Lebanese civil war left many gaps whether on 
the administrative or the service level that the state could not fill. Hezbollah and 
other political parties and fundamentalist organizations filled these gaps. 
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Interestingly, with the absence of the government in the aftermath of the war, not 
only did Hezbollah surpass its Shi’a rivals but also other non-governmental 
organizations that were distributing funds to other organizations or projects. 
Whereas other parties were preoccupied with providing social services in an 
attempt to challenge Lebanon’s inefficient system, Hezbollah focused on social, 
educational and medical services in an attempt to serve and control the Shi’a 
community, but and most importantly in order to gain some legitimacy as a party in 
the Lebanese political scene. Harik emphasizes the importance of Hezbollah’s 
capacity to fight Israelis and gain its community’s public support. “Hezbollah’s 
capacity to fight the Israelis depends on a positive relationship with the state and 
firm public support, and that sacred mission takes precedence over any other 
consideration” (Harik 2004, 81). Hezbollah’s humanitarian motives in combatting 
poverty lie in the creation of a “resistant community”. In fact, Hezbollah made a 
religious issue out of poverty and then tied it to political and military struggle. It is 
worth noting that as per US government estimates Hezbollah, receives around USD 
100~200 million on a yearly basis under the form of Bunyads: funds used by the 
clergy in an attempt to finance Iran’s charitable and political agenda abroad (Harik 
2004, 82). Those funds play an important role in Hezbollah’s ability to secure the 
support of large sectors of the Shi’a community. Those funds play an instrumental 
role in Hezbollah’s ability to secure the support of large sector of the Shi’a 
community.  
 
4.5 The Inclusion Phase 
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          Hezbollah’s political integration started slowly but surely when it contested 
the first postwar elections in 1992. Participation in the elections created a clear 
dilemma for Hezbollah. The party was torn between participating in a government 
that it previously labeled corrupt, and seizing the opportunity and competing in the 
elections (Norton 2007, 99) to demonstrate its Lebanese credentials. 
          Hezbollah’s leaders had originally rejected the idea of participating in the 
political process in the 1980s. Sayyed Muhammad Husain Fadlallah, one of the 
most important and influential Shi’a clerics in Lebanon, espoused a somehow 
moderate approach vis-à-vis Hezbollah’s participation. He looked at political 
participation as a means of achieving gradual reforms in society, since establishing 
Islamic rule was somehow unachievable due to Lebanon’s confessional society. He 
“emphasized the need to come to a modus vivendi with the state rather than remain 
outside the political system and judge it as abhorrent in strictly Islamic terms” 
(Norton 2009, 99). Many other clerics made similar points: Sheikh Mohammad 
Mehdi Shams Al-din, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Shi’a council from 1978-
2001, stressed the importance of Islamic moderation and integration into the 
Lebanese political scene. Mallat emphasizes the importance of a pluralist 
representative state in which “confessional democracy would be based on the 
principle of consultation” (Mallat, 1988). This being said, it is interesting to look 
back at the internal debate that took place prior to the 1992 elections. 
Hassan Nasrallah, Naim Qassem, Subhi Tufaily and nine other Hezbollah 
leaders debated the dilemma of participating in the political system: they tackled 
the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s participation in a non-Islamic government, its 
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ideology and its ties to practical interests, and cooperation with a secular 
government and thus the abandonment of Hezbollah’s main principles revolving 
around the Islamic Sharia (Norton 2009, 100). The majority of the leaders thought 
that it would be in the party’s best interest to make a compromise and thus run in 
the elections that would take place in the summer of 1992. Only Tufayli opposed 
this view. He argued that by running in the elections, Hezbollah would be 
undergoing a deep transformation whereby the party would become a mere political 
participant instead of being a resistance party and a revolutionary force. Iran’s 
supreme leader Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ruhollah Khomeini after his death, 
gave his blessing with respect to Hezbollah’s participation in the elections. Iran 
supported Hezbollah’s decision to participate in the political realm and so did the 
Shi’a community which looked at political participation as a way for future 
political empowerment. 
          Hezbollah’s decision to contest the 1992 elections created a rift in the party 
with Tufayli leading the camp of those who opposed the decision. It also signaled 
the victory of pragmatism over ideology. In the end, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah 
announced Hizbollah’s participation in the 1992 summer elections (Norton 2009, 
101). The differences in terminology and ideas between the 1985 Open Letter and 
the 1992 parliamentary election program were substantial. 
          Hezbollah launched its political program on 2 July 1992. The program was 
addressed to all Lebanese and not only to the party’s adherents. Hezbollah all but 
abandoned the call for an Islamic participation that would in return ensure reforms 
within Lebanese society. The program revolved around the development of the 
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following pillars: liberating Lebanon from “Zionist” occupation, putting an end to 
political sectarianism, pursuing social, educational and administrative reforms, and 
last but not least ensuring political and media freedoms. Addressing the whole 
Lebanese population and embracing an anti-sectarian stance underscored 
Hezbollah’s dramatic shift with respect to its views appearing in the 1985 Open 
Letter, where the party had stated that the Lebanese system is unjust and thus 
should be “radically” changed. To sum up then, the decision to integrate into the 
Lebanese political system gave Hezbollah a sense of belonging to Lebanese 
society; but also the ability to survive in the aftermath of Israel’s withdrawal from 
South Lebanon. It was also proof that Hezbollah can and is willing to compromise 
by adopting more moderate political stances. 
 
4.5.1 Hezbollah and the Political System 
          In the 1992 elections, Hezbollah and its non-Shi’a political allies were able to 
secure twelve seats in the 128 members of parliament; eight of these seats went to 
Hezbollah members, four to non-Shi’a Hezbollah supporters. In the 1996 elections, 
Hezbollah went on to win ten seats out of 128, 7 of them being for the party itself 
while the remaining 3 went to its allies.  In the summer of 1998 the first postwar 
municipal elections were held. Hezbollah participated and won most of the seats in 
South Lebanon, secured an important portion in the Beqaa, and practically won all 
the seats in the Shi’a districts of Southern suburbs of Beirut (Saad-Ghorayeb 46). 
This signaled Hezbollah’s evolution from an “Iran influenced conspiratorial 
terrorist group” rejecting participation in Lebanese politics, to a party with 
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considerable autonomy and a talent for playing politics and winning elections 
(Norton, 6). 
          Not only did Hezbollah’s success in the 1992 elections shift the way 
Hezbollah positioned itself within Lebanese territories, it also showed the extent to 
which the party had become indispensable to the Shi’a community. Ghorayeb 
suggests that Hezbollah’s political “Infitah” or openness was a function of the 
power shift in the Iranian leadership, namely the victory of the moderate faction led 
by Hashemi Rafsanjani over the group led by Hujjat el-Islam Ali Akbar 
Muhtashemi. Following the 1992 parliamentary elections, Sayyed Hassan 
Nasrallah was elected as Hezbollah’s secretary-general and Sheikh Naim Qassem 
as deputy secretary-general. This did not end the party’s resistance to Israel after its 
integration into the Lebanese political system. However, did this shift in 
Hezbollah’s path in the post-1992 parliamentary election era pave the way to its 
moderation? 
           The postwar Lebanese government did not only oppose Hezbollah’s “Open 
Letter”, but also its military operations in South Lebanon. Not only did the 
Lebanese government compete with the party’s popularity as the only resistant 
force in Lebanon, it also could not contain its actions. Hezbollah used to plan and 
execute its operations without coordinating with the Lebanese government. The 
lack of communications between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government created a 
schism between the government and the party. The party would initiate an attack 
without giving prior notice to the government or consulting it on field operations 
matters, leaving the authorities to deal with the consequent destruction, casualties 
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and population displacement resulting from Israel’s retaliation. The Lebanese 
government sought to deter Israel by diplomacy, in an attempt to limit Hezbollah’s 
control in South Lebanon. The aim behind using diplomacy was twofold. On the 
one hand, the Lebanese government would end the Israeli occupation in South 
Lebanon while on the other hand it will be acting against Hezbollah’s very raison 
d’etre by ending its activities against Israel and limiting its presence at the borders. 
Harik goes as far as to note that apart from the fear that the Lebanese government 
had vis-à-vis the response that could emerge from Hezbollah’s military acts 
towards Israel, the party was also using military acts against the enemy for its own 
“aggrandizement”.  The party’s military wing, along the Iranian-Syrian operational 
aids, mainly military, logistics, intelligence and financial supports, helped 
Hezbollah transition from being a local resistant party to a regional power that 
influenced directly the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as peace negotiations. “The 
arrangements between Hezbollah and Iran to oppose Israeli occupation in southern 
Lebanon were facilitated by the Assad regime, because they furthered its strategy 
of indirect confrontation with the Israelis with no loss of Syrian influence in 
Lebanon” (Harik, 2005).  
 
4.5.2 The Era of the Political Programs: 
          Despite the schism that was growing between Hezbollah and the government, 
the party’s reservoir of public support grew at an increasing rate throughout the 
1990s. This support legitimized Hezbollah’s resistance and military acts against 
Israel and helped the party by extending further popular support during the 1992, 
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1996 and 2000 parliamentary elections. The 1996 electoral program did not differ 
much from the previous one. It focused on human and economic rights in addition 
to achieving social justice and unity of the country. Moreover, and in an attempt to 
win new seats, the party’s electoral program focused on the cease-fire agreements 
that were signed in the aftermath of the massacre of Lebanese civilians in Qana. 
Similar themes were tackled in 2000 but a section was added with respect to 
Hezbollah’s efforts to guarantee Lebanon’s sovereignty and the fact that 
Hezbollah’s fighters gave their blood to their country. The Political Program of 
2005, focused on three main issues: “the adoption of Islam as a way of life, the 
struggle against corruption and the end of occupation in Palestine” (Van Engeland 
and Rudolph, 40). In an interview with the Egyptian newspaper Al- Ahram on 20 
February 2000, Nasrallah labeled the phase varying between 1992 and 2005 as an 
evolutionary phase in the history of Hezbollah whereby the party became a national 
movement with mainstream political aspiration (Noe, 214). Similarly, Alagha 
labels this era  as “the era of the political programme”, whereby “Hezbollah 
integrated more and more into the public sphere even attempting to control it after 
the Second Lebanon War” (Alagha, 2007).  
Since the 1990’s, Hezbollah has evolved as a mainstream political party, 
extending great social services to Lebanese in general and Shi’a in particular, and 
participating in municipality and parliamentary elections. The party discovered that 
its political program helped in enhancing its legitimacy and widened its public 
support. Furthermore, the party tried to Lebanonize itself by emphasizing the fact 
that its acts were directed towards Israel in an attempt to deter Israeli attacks and 
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protect Lebanon’s infrastructure and citizens. In the above-mentioned Al-Ahram 
interview, which took place after the destruction of three power plants in Lebanon 
resulting from the killing of 7 Israeli soldiers in January 2000, Nasrallah declared 
that the party will practice self-restraint, demonstrating the party’s political 
evolution: 
Our second objective is to protect Lebanon’s infrastructure and population. 
Based on that, we believe that it is in Lebanon’s national interest, and the 
interest of the resistance, that we restrain ourselves while reserving the right 
to respond when we see fit. We believe that Israel’s main intention was to 
provoke Hezbollah into responding violently, and that our self-restraint de-
stabilized their entire plan. 
 
Nasrallah’s logic reaffirms that Hezbollah made a major change with respect to the 
nature of its Political Programme (Al-Ahram, 2009). 
 
The party’s programs reveals a double discourse in the evolution of 
Hezbollah: “the clean and neat political discourse relying on a liberal political 
Islam makes a clear cut between politics and ideology. However, “Hezbollah still 
speaks in coded language when addressing its militants” (Van Engelend and 
Rudolph 2013, 40). This highlights the fact that Hezbollah’s moderation is only 
instrumental. An example given by Van Engelend and Rudolph is this respect 
revolves around the establishment of the Islamic republic in Lebanon. Whereas the 
debate around the establishment of an Islamic republic remains present within the 
party, Hezbollah pretends that it has given up on it and that it is no longer part of its 
agenda in Lebanon.  
Yet, the period after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon posed serious challenges 
to Hezbollah’s moderation. Further analysis of the party’s activities in the post- 
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Israeli withdrawal period shows how geopolitical variables pose an obstacle in the 
path of Hezbollah’s enduring moderation. 
 
4.6 Geopolitics and the Path towards Moderation: 
         When Israel withdrew from Lebanon on 24 May 2000, ending eighteen years 
of occupation, Hezbollah’s raison d’etre was challenged. Its presence was 
theoretically no longer viable. The party however “argued that the total liberation 
of Lebanon had not been achieved due to the continued presence of Israeli forces in 
the Shebaa Farms” (Salloukh and Mikaelian, 20). The Shebaa Farms are a small 
piece of land that both Syria and Hezbollah consider as part of Lebanon, while 
Israel considers it as being part of the occupied Golan Heights. The justifications 
by both Syria and Hezbollah failed to convince many Lebanese who thought that 
the party’s arms were deployed at the service of Syria’s interest in the region in 
general and in Lebanon particularly (Salloukh, 2005). However, Lebanon was then 
under Syrian control and Hezbollah’s logic mirrored that of Syria’s. Salloukh and 
Mikaelian emphasize the importance of Syria’s geopolitical calculations on 
Hezbollah’s logic. In the aftermath of Hafez al-Assad’s death and the rise to power 
of Bashar al-Assad the Syrian Hezbollah relation changed. It became a relationship 
whereby Syria no longer exerted automatic power over Hezbollah (Salloukh and 
Mikaelian, 2013). Bashar enhanced Hezbollah’s political status and power not only 
by receiving Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in Damascus but also by sending advanced 
weaponry to the party.  
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 In the Al-Ahram interview of February 2000, Nasrallah clearly defined the nature 
of the party’s relationship with Syria: “At a time when the rest of our Arab brothers 
are busy pursuing their own interests, our friendship, brotherly relations, mutual 
trust, cooperation, and exchange of views with Syria are as strong as ever. But in 
the pursuit of the national and popular interests, Hezbollah makes its decisions 
alone and as it sees fit, and Israel’s portrayal of Hezbollah as a Syrian tool is 
completely wrong”. Albeit insisting that Syria is a sister country, Nasrallah went 
with great strengths to emphasize that the party takes Lebanon’s national interest 
into account when making any decision (Al Ahram, 2000).   
          After defining the new relationship between Hezbollah and Syria, it is worth 
shedding light on the enhancement of this relationship at the aftermath of Hariri’s 
death, the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon and the 2007 fighting. Syria’s alleged role 
in all those events shows that it is a strong geopolitical force with the ability to 
influence Hezbollah’s moderation. 
4.6.1 The Dynamic Duo: Syria and Hezbollah 
          Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah started 
facing national, regional and international challenges. On the national level, the 
party was trying to remind the public at many instances of the importance of its 
weapons as a real deterrence against Israel, and hence its inability to demobilize. 
For long, it kept reminding Lebanese about Israel’s constant violation of the 
national airspace. On the regional level Hezbollah brought up its duty to free the 
Shebaa Farms: a responsibility it owed to Lebanon and to the Arab Israeli conflict. 
“As long as there will be an inch of Lebanese soil occupied the resistance will have 
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the right to continue the struggle combat of which nobody in Lebanon disputes the 
legitimacy”, claimed Nasrallah (Noe 280-281). On the international level, however, 
a new status quo was created in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the 
United States. Hezbollah’s militants saw in this attack a call for the reemergence of 
terrorism whereas the leaders tried to maintain its political face. In both cases it is 
essential to note that the 9/11 terrorists attacks re-initiated the debate within 
Hezbollah regarding the party’s role and nature.  
          The challenges that faced Hezbollah, whether on the national, regional or 
international levels threatened its relationship with Syria. Nasrallah emphasized the 
importance of Syria and Iran’s support of Hezbollah’s activities that were serving 
Lebanon’s national interest. He often underscored the theme that an assault against 
Lebanon would indirectly involve Iran and Syria in Hezbollah’s favor, an act 
deemed alienating by those Lebanese who did not like the tripartite relation 
between Hezbollah, Syria and Iran. Salloukh and Mikaelian assert that Hezbollah’s 
relationship with Syria faced its first test in 2004, when the UN Security Council 
issued resolution 1559 censuring Syrian intervention in Lebanese affairs and 
calling on the Lebanese government to disband and disarm all Lebanese militias, 
including the Hezbollah. Salloukh and Mikaelian note that in parallel to its relation 
with Syria, Hezbollah fortified its relationship with Iran too, thus embedding itself 
in the US-Iranian confrontation in the region. Meanwhile, Lebanese Prime Minister 
Rafic Hariri’s assassination in February 2005 tipped the balance of power between 
Hezbollah and Syria. International pressure against Syria was mounting in the 
aftermath of Hariri’s assassination in an attempt to force it to withdraw from 
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Lebanon. On 26 April 2005, Syrian troops officially withdrew from Lebanon. By 
pressuring Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, the US thought that it would be 
decreasing the leverage that Syria had over Hezbollah. However, not only did 
Damascus use Lebanese political institutions in order to support and give political 
cover to Hezbollah, but also directed a part of the Lebanese state’s security 
apparatus to support logistically the arming of Hezbollah (Rabil, 2007). 
By arming Hezbollah and targeting the politicians that supported the Cedar 
Revolution, Syria hoped to prove that it is the only force capable of standing 
against chaos in Lebanon. The continuous pressure on both Syria and Hezbollah at 
the aftermath of Hariri’s death metamorphosed Syria’s relationship with its 
counterpart into a strategic one. In June 2006, and just prior to Israel’s war on 
Lebanon, both Iran and Syria signed a defense treaty whereby Iran committed itself 
to defend Syria in case of a US or Israeli attack. Rabil stresses on the importance of 
this treaty in reinforcing the relations ship between Syria and Iran. Hezbollah 
remains a tool in the hands of both powers, he adds (Rabil, 2007). It is essential 
thus to focus on the Hezbollah-Syria-Iran axis for a better understanding of 
Hezbollah’s performance in the months that followed the signature of the defense 
treaty. 
 
4.6.2 Hezbollah A proxy for Iran? 
Whereas Syria regards Iran as a strategic partner that could help in its fight 
for survival, Iran used Syria in order to spread its hegemony in the Middle East. 
Moreover, both regard Hezbollah as their proxy in the region. Most probably both 
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Syria and Iran knew about the cross-border operation that their protégé Hezbollah 
conducted in July 2006, thus provoking a war between Israel and Lebanon. There is 
also a very high possibility that Hezbollah triggered this incident to underscore the 
importance of its weapon arsenal. A huge debate was created around the results of 
this war. Hezbollah and its partisans asserted that they came out of the 2006 war 
victorious, while the supporters of the March 14 coalition claimed otherwise. In all 
cases, it is essential to note that Hezbollah was able to prove once more that its 
armed presence was nonnegotiable. Moreover, it truly acted as a regional power 
thus becoming the first “Arab army to attack Haifa since 1948” (Rabil 2007, pp 43-
51). At the aftermath of the 2006 war, some Lebanese political elites and parties 
along with both and Iran embraced Hezbollah’s victory. In fact, some would argue 
that Iran was totally aware of Hezbollah’s activities and went as far as to push the 
party into this war thus sacrificing Lebanon for the its own benefits in the region. 
There was also some accusations that Iran dragged Hezbollah into this war in an 
attempt to divert the international community from its nuclear program. The US 
State Department coordinator for counter-terrorism asserted that Iranian 
participants were directly involved in the combat. He went as far as to label Iran as 
being the “paymaster” who spent “hundreds of millions of dollars” whether on 
arms or other form of support in order to back Hezbollah. He went as far as to say 
that Iran pushed Hezbollah to start the war (William Samii 2008, p 50). 
          Hezbollah’s acts in the aftermath of the 2006 war on Lebanon demonstrate 
that the party serves as a proxy for Iran, its geopolitical protégé. Not only did Iran 
fully support Hezbollah’s war, and provide the party’s combatants with weapons 
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and arms, it went as far as to push Hezbollah’s ministers to resign from the cabinet. 
By so doing, Hezbollah’s ministers thought they could change the power formula in 
the country and secure a bigger share in the political system. They also assumed 
that the government would collapse without their participation. However, unlike 
the party’s predictions the government did not collapse as a result of strong support 
from Saudi Arabia. The government also proceeded with the International tribunal. 
Following Hezbollah’s resignation from the government, the party used political 
violence in an attempt to push the government to render to its demands. After a sit-
in that lasted more than 18 months in Down Town Beirut, Hezbollah was able to 
take over the capital in six days. This pushed the government to offer great 
concessions in the party’s favor. Kohler emphasizes the importance of diplomacy, 
and most importantly Qatar’s mediation, in helping Hezbollah’s minority coalition 
gain veto power in the Lebanese parliament thus ensuring the party’s ability “to 
veto any future bills concerning the disarmament of Hezbollah, which further 
increased the group’s power in the government” (Cohler, 2011).  
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
        The aftermath of the 2006 war against Israel and the 2008 actions fueled 
sectarianism in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s war went from fighting the enemy Israel, to 
fighting a national counterpart. Even though the party was included in the political 
process it did not renounce the utility of its weapon arsenal. It did somehow 
embrace moderation by running for elections and entered the political arena. 
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However it was not and will never be a weapons free moderate political party, for 
its ties with Iran and Syria will always be an impediment in the path of total 
moderation and hence demobilization. The next chapter contrasts both Hamas and 
Hezbollah’s path to moderation. A clear depiction of both parties shows that 
perhaps the Arab Spring’s emergence was not particularly in their favor thus 
showing once again that these two parties are deemed incapable of achieving 
complete moderation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Hamas, Hezbollah and the Arab Spring 
5.1- Recapping the Argument 
The challenge of including Islamists in the political process was explored 
by many scholars since the 1980s until the present time. Debates revolving around 
whether to include or exclude them have moved to explore the essence of Islamist 
extremism and moderation. The first chapter of the thesis examined the inclusion-
moderation theory with respect to political Islamist groups. In order to fully explore 
the theory, it was essential to explore the concept of moderation, in addition to the 
moderate-radical dichotomy. What does moderation mean? Can we talk about a 
radical actor on the way to moderation? Can Islamists moderate or are they trying 
to embrace certain attitudes that do not really fit their true colors? Do they 
moderate their politics because they have come to embrace new positions on core 
beliefs and ideological values or do they simply shift their positions, and perhaps 
for a very short period of time, in order to attain political advantages? This thesis 
tested these questions against the core of Hamas and Hezbollah.  
          After discussing many definitions of moderate and radical, and unpacking the 
notion of moderation, the first chapter revisited the scholarly literature with respect 
to moderation in studies of democratization. The second chapter of this thesis 
examined Schwedler’s “Inclusion-Moderation theory” with respect to political 
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Islam. It explored its three different approaches and discussed the scholarship on 
political Islam that falls within each category. The three different approaches are: 
the behavioral moderation of groups, ideological moderation of groups and 
ideological moderation of individuals. It is true that the Islamic revival has taken a 
violent or fundamentalist form in some cases, however, one could talk about the 
Muslim Brotherhood as being a unique case in this regard. The third chapter 
examined how the Muslim Brotherhood’s affiliate in the occupied territories, 
Hamas, was able to show some signs of moderation after being included in the 
political process. It first tackled Hamas’s beginnings, its themes, and its objectives 
in addition to how it rose to power. It focused on the methods used by the party in 
addition to its instrumental moderation to justify its inclusion in the government. 
Last but not least it asserted that geopolitics is the main and constant variable 
behind Hamas’s moderation. 
           “The lessons of the Islamic revolution rippled throughout the region, 
especially in the Gulf states, the West Bank and Gaza, but it had its more direct and 
profound impact on the circle of young Lebanese Mullas who formed Hezbollah, 
who identified with the revolution’s ideology and embraced the principle of 
government by the Supreme Jurist (Harik, 2004, 16). The fourth chapter of the 
thesis tackled Hezbollah’s origins, theology and ideology. It is worth emphasizing 
the fact that Hezbollah’s ideology and theology stems from the Iranian revolution 
and that their allegiance is directed towards Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and, after his death, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. After highlighting 
Hezbollah’s rise to power, the chapter showed how this party was able to enter the 
78 
  
 
political scene by changing its radical face and transforming itself from being, at 
one point in time, a violent militia to a moderate political party but with a colossal 
military arsenal. It also emphasized the fact that Hezbollah’s inclusion in the 
political process is not the only path to moderation. The balance of this chapter 
addresses the current and possible consequences of the Arab popular uprising on 
both Hamas and Hezbollah.  
Undoubtedly, geopolitics is an essential variable in the decision to 
moderate. For both Hezbollah and Hamas. Both Gaza and Lebanon border the two 
central Arab spring hubs, Egypt and Syria, noting that both parties had double 
standard stances vis-a-vis the deep political and structural changes that took place 
in 2011 and up to this day. Hezbollah’s direct military intervention in Syria to 
support the Assad regime against both its domestic and external opponents 
hindered any possibility for a potential moderation not only on the national level, 
but also on the regional one. Early in 2011, Hezbollah strongly supported the 
overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and the Al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain. It also 
went as far as to depict the Arab uprisings as the fruit of the Iranian revolution over 
the period of thirty years. In his speech on 25
 
January 2012, Ayatollah Khamenei 
described events in Egypt as an “Islamic awakening” inspired by Iran’s own 1979 
revolution (Kahl, 2012). Although, Hezbollah stood by the Arab uprising with the 
fall of the Egyptian regime in February 2011 linking the uprising to its own 
resistance ethos, it later performed a 180 degrees turn on its previous endorsement 
of the uprisings by shifting from a party that once supported the oppressed popular 
movements, to one supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Benedetta Berti goes 
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as far as to mention that since then, Hezbollah stood with the Syrian regime while 
discrediting the protesters and arguing that the anti-Assad movements is backed up 
by the West. Moreover, Hezbollah continued to stand by the Assad regime even 
when the anti-regime demonstrations culminated and reached a full fledge war 
(Berti 2012, 23).  
          Much like Hezbollah, Hamas, was directly affected by the Arab Spring. In 
fact, Berti (2012) affirms that Hamas has been undergoing a number of important 
changes in order to adapt to the shifting regional environment. Just like Hezbollah, 
it openly supported the nascent protest movement starting with Tunisia in 2011 
followed by Egypt and Libya. The retreat of Hamas from the Egyptian political 
scene after the overthrow of Morsi, is becoming reactive and no longer proactive. 
Thus, Hamas is currently adapting to some extent to the geopolitical changes and 
development instead of initiating them. The new status-quo in the region in general 
and in Egypt and Syria in particular, forced Hamas and Hezbollah to drastically 
change their religious coalition to a more practical “survival of the fittest” one. This 
in fact, led to a structural, political and religious division into the so-called “Axis of 
resistance”. Paul Salem attributes this division to the fact that people wanted good 
government and social justice and were no longer infatuated with Iran or the “axis 
of resistance” (Salem 2013).  “As the Muslim Brotherhood rose in Egypt, 
Hezbollah’s erstwhile ally, Hamas, drifted away from it and its Syrian and Iranian 
backers, and found a new footing in Egypt and the Gulf”, he adds. Furthermore, the 
departure of Hamas’s officials’ from Damascus, and more particularly its move to 
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Qatar in 2012, signifies its exit  from a historical non-religious coalition, to a purely 
Sunni religious one.  
          Hamas’s situation seems to be a difficult one at the aftermath of the Arab 
Spring. It is suffering from new internal divisions. In February 2012, Gaza leader 
Mahmoud Al-Zahar criticized an agreement by political chief Khaled Meshal, who 
resides in Syria, to end a five-year rift with the Palestinian President Mahmoud 
Abbas’s Fatah’s party (Mitnick 2012). “It is very noticeable that the Hamas 
leadership in Gaza is drifting away from the Hamas exiled leadership. Meshal has 
been weakened. He is trying to show some moderation because of the changes in 
the Middle East but the Hamas leaders in the Gaza strip are on their own territory 
and not as affected”, suggests Mkhaimar Abusada. 
          While Hamas maintains strong ties with Iran, the popular uprising in Syria 
suggests that there are limits to its willingness to play a client role for Iran. As a 
result, Hamas has abandoned its resistance role, and allying with the pro-American 
camp composed of Turkey, Egypt, and Qatar. Jonathan Schanzer, suggests that the 
movement has dispatched senior figures to deal with these three forces in an 
attempt to realign with the new regional Sunni order. Over time, he adds, this 
triumvirate was able to fill the void left by Iran (Algemeiner 2013). The rift 
between Hamas and Iran should be used in a positive way though in order to push 
for a Hamas-Fatah government that would eventually recognize Israel and advance 
Peace process. The geopolitical variable can play an important role in this respect. 
Eliot Abrahams suggests that Turkey’s emergence as sponsor for Hamas reflects 
the anticipated demise of the Assad regime in Damascus, and the problems this 
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causes for Hamas. Guseynov suggests that Turkey could become the new sponsor 
and protector of Hamas, with the failure of Assad’s regime and the weakening of 
Iran’s role in Syria (Guseynov 2012). He goes as far as to declare that Hamas could 
greatly moderate ideologically, in return for upgrading its ties with Turkey, joining 
the peace process opponents, and backing the Hamas-Fatah unity government. 
Recent talks suggest that Turkey might extend financial aid to Hamas in order to 
fill the gap created by Iran’s exit thus absorbing Hamas furthermore into its orbit. 
One of the essential consequences of the Arab Spring on the “Axis of resistance” is 
the isolation of Iran, Syria and somehow Hezbollah from the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks. It is without doubt that this event resulted in Hamas’s geopolitical 
deterioration on the regional and domestic levels, especially after losing its 
traditional allies on the one hand and Egypt on the other, specifically after Morsi’s 
isolation on 30 June 2013.  
 
5.2- Hezbollah, Hamas and the Arab Spring: 
The Arab Spring has had great impact on Hamas and Hezbollah’s path to 
moderation. Salloukh suggests that “Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria, 
most notably in Qusayr in April 2013, damaged the party’s domestic legitimacy 
and reopened the debate over its weapons” (Salloukh 2014). This is a clear 
reflection of how any attempt for moderation, whether on the domestic or the 
regional level, failed after Hezbollah intervened military in Syria. Hezbollah’s path 
to moderation is with no doubt a non-linear one. The fact that Hezbollah is not 
fighting Israel anymore, but rather anti-Assad militants, reveals an anti-moderation 
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perspective. In fact, this signaled the enhancement of Hezbollah’s anti-moderation 
policies specifically after the civil unrest that took place on 7 May 2008.  
The case of Hamas is somehow different from Hezbollah’s. The drift 
between Hamas’s leadership and the decentralization of the political, ideological 
and religious bureau along the geographical isolation from both Egypt and Israel 
reinforced Hamas’s anti-moderation stance. Unlike Hezbollah, the geopolitical 
variable here is creating two different scenarios. First, and in the face of the current 
status quo, based on the Muslim Brotherhood’s discriminative policies in Egypt, 
Hamas will remain in self-isolation hoping for a second scenario. Hamas’s network 
of subterranean tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, especially created to smuggle 
fuel and carry operations in Egypt if needed be, toppled with violence in the Sinai 
peninsula all contributed in the deterioration of the Hamas Egyptian ties. Hamas’s 
rocky relationship with Egypt, especially after the overthrow of Morsi, clearly 
depict that the movement cannot but opt for a national reconciliatory stance 
(Schanzer 2013). Second, and in case of national reconciliation, supported by 
regional moderate powers such as Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, Hamas would rather be 
integrated into a broader national Palestinian government that would slowly but 
surely move it from isolation to pragmatism. It is essential to note that the Arab 
Spring had a direct bearing in this respect. The demonstrations in the Arab world 
initiated protests in Gaza calling for national reconciliation between Hamas and 
Fatah. “This will create a new political islam in which a coalition is the main goal; 
not to monopolize the regime”, says Joel Greenberg (2011).Furthermore, he 
emphasizes the importance of the reconciliation talks with Fatah, which will 
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constitute a key test of Hamas’s willingness to share power. Thus, both parties 
either reconcile or risk being “ousted from office”. The Cairo Agreement was 
signed in April 2011, with the help of the Egyptian mediation; demonstrating that 
Hamas was indeed willing to change its initial goals and demands (Lovlie and 
Knudsen 2013, 57). Dag Tuastad emphasizes the consequences of Hamas’s entry to 
the Palestinian National Council. For Tuastad “Hamas's entry into the PNC would, 
first of all, imply increased democratization rather than radicalization within the 
PLO, and equally within Hamas” (Tuastad 2013). Thus, and for the first time in the 
history of Hamas, the party is demanding integration without asking the PLO to 
change its charter during the pre-election phase. The very process of inclusion in 
the political sphere, backed by the geopolitical variable, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar in 
this case, will leave Hamas far from Iranian pressure to shock the Israeli-
Palestinian peace talks. All this suggests that geopolitics, more so than domestic or 
organizational variables, is clearly responsible for Hamas’s moderation or the lack 
of it. 
 In sum, Hamas and Hezbollah have been directly but unequally affected by 
the Arab Spring. One can say that the balance sheet has not been proportionally 
equal between both organizations. Hezbollah, was negatively impacted than 
Hamas. The Shia ‘a party was damaged due to its double standard vis-a- vis the 
Arab Spring uprisings but also and more particularly due to its involvement in 
defense of Bashar in Syria. Hamas has shown that it was capable of dealing more 
successfully with the Arab uprising. 
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 It is hard to talk about the Arab Spring’s direct effect on the moderation of 
religious parties such as Hamas and Hezbollah without bringing up the importance 
of the geopolitical variable’s effect in this respect. While the geopolitical variable 
in the case of Hamas has displayed a somehow linear process in its path towards 
moderation, this was not the case for the Lebanese Hezbollah. We cannot say that 
the geopolitical variable has moderated Hamas per se but we can say that it helped 
in the party’s transformation: the latest manifestation of these transformations 
being the reconciliatory deal between Fatah and Hamas in Gaza on 24 April, 2014. 
The move of the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas was faced with anger as it 
took Israelis and their intelligence apparatus by surprise. Furthermore, Abbas was 
criticized for coping with the extremists: Hamas being designated as a terrorist 
organization by both Israel and the United States. Perhaps the reconciliation is only 
temporary, perhaps Hamas will never lead Hamas into Gaza and Mahmoud Abbas 
will never give Hamas the benefit of ruling the West Bank. However, one thing is 
for sure, time only will determine if the geopolitical variable will keep on pushing 
for further moderation in Hamas’s case thus making the process a linear one. 
 In the case of Hezbollah, the moderation process was not a linear one but 
rather reversible. Although the Party of God tried to moderate at so many instances 
by creating a political platform and a political program, it failed to achieve 
complete moderation, especially with its weapons arsenal and geopolitical 
obligations. One can say that Iran is the geopolitical variable that posed an 
impediment to Hezbollah’s moderation. Tehran invested materially and politically, 
in Hezbollah, its geopolitical proxy, and used it to defend its geopolitical interests 
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in Syria (Salloukh, 2014). Not only did the party’s control in Qusayr “prove a game 
changer” in the war but it also reflected Hezbollah’s enthusiasm in using its arms 
once its interests were threatened. Hamas and Hezbollah agreed to disagree on their 
stance vis-avis the war in Syria while keeping their strategic goal, fighting Israel, 
intact. Total divorce will not take place between these two entities; however, the 
current reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas might change the geopolitical 
dynamic once again and the future may change the weather forecast yet again for 
Hamas and Hezbollah in the midst of a changing Arab climate. 
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